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A CHINA IN THE BULL SHOP?*
COMPARING THE RHETORIC OF A RISING CHINA
WITH THE REALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF THE SEA
Jonathan G. Odom**

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s and the
conclusion of Mao Zedong’s reign, the People’s Republic of China (PRC
* The idiom “a bull in a china shop” has long been used to describe “a very clumsy
creature in a delicate situation.”
Bull in a China Shop Definition,
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/Bull+in+a+China+shop
(last visited Jan. 31, 2012). The actual origin of this idiom is unknown, although an early
use of the phrase can be found in FREDERICK MARRYAT, JACOB FAITHFUL 130 (1895)
(“I’m like a bull in a china shop.”). Additionally, a slang English definition of the word
“bull” includes “empty boastful talk.” See “Bull,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bull.
** Commander Jonathan G. Odom is an active-duty judge advocate in the U.S. Navy.
Commander Odom earned his Bachelor of Arts with Distinction in History from Duke
University, his Juris Doctor from Wake Forest University School of Law, and is a
licensed member of the North Carolina Bar. Previously, he has served as a legal advisor
for admirals and generals in the Pentagon, for afloat commanders during operational
deployments to the Arabian Gulf and the Asia-Pacific region, and for multi-national
ground force commanders in Iraq and Kosovo. Of note, he also completed a three-year
assignment as an international law instructor at the U.S. Naval Justice School, during
which he also taught international law at the U.S. Naval War College, Surface Warfare
Officer School, Naval Submarine School, and Naval Chaplains School. Currently, he is
serving as the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (Deputy Legal Advisor) for Commander,
U.S. Pacific Command, headquartered in Hawaii, with a legal portfolio focused on
oceans law and policy, the law of armed conflict, and the legal aspects of maritime
security. In his personal capacity, Commander Odom has spoken at international and
U.S. academic forums and has been published on matters related to the law of the sea, the
law of armed conflict, national security strategy, maritime policy, and homeland defense.
He can be contacted at jonathan.odom@usa.com. The views presented are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the U.S.
Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, or any of its components.
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or China) has made progress in its understanding of both domestic and
1
In the domestic context, China has initiated
international law.
improvements to its statutes and regulations, its law enforcement
agencies, and its judicial system.2 These steps forward have been offset
by periodic missteps that have resulted in criticism from external
3
organizations, including international human rights groups and foreign
4
government entities, about continuing or lingering deficiencies in
China’s approach to the law. Regardless, in comparison to the Mao-era
5
legal concepts of “rule by law” and “rule of man,” China’s authoritarian
regime has recently made some positive strides toward what outside
6
observers hope could someday reflect a true rule-of-law system.
Nevertheless, concerns remain and the proverbial jury is still out on
1. Jamie P. Horsley, Rule of Law in China: Incremental Progress, in THE BALANCE
SHEET IN 2007 AND BEYOND 94 (C. Fred Bergsten, N. Lardy, B. Gill & D. Mitchell, eds.,
2007),
https://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Panel%202%20090
212_05rule_of_law.pdf.
2. Id. at 94-95.
3. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, CHINA ANNUAL REPORT 2011 – THE STATE OF THE
WORLDS HUMAN RIGHTS, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/china/report2011.
4. For a detailed discussion of legal developments in China, see generally CONG.
EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, 112th CONG., ANNUAL REPORT (2011), available at
http://www.cecc.gov/; for a detailed discussion of human rights developments in China,
see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/.
5. STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 88
(1999) (“Chinese [legal] theory under Mao began from altogether different premises
[than Western legal theory]. It saw law as the tool of a ruling class placed in the service
of politics and rejected sharp differentiation among judicial, legal, and administrative
processes.”); see also BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, THEORY, AND
POLITICS 3 (2004).
Chinese leaders want rule by law, not rule of law . . . The difference . . . is that
under the rule of law, the law is preeminent and can serve as a check against the
abuse of power. Under rule by law, the law can serve as a mere tool for a
government that suppresses in a legalistic fashion.
Id. (quoting Chinese law professor Li Shuguang).
6. LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 5; Horsley, supra note 1, at 94 (“No one claims that
today’s China is a ‘rule of law’ country. Nonetheless, most would acknowledge that
China has moved a long way from the primarily ‘rule of man’ governance approach of
traditional and Maoist China. This essay suggests that China is also moving beyond the
instrumental ‘rule by law’ paradigm in which government merely uses law as a tool to
control society. Instead, China is slowly establishing elements of a ‘rule of law’ system
that increasingly provides mechanisms also to restrain the arbitrary exercise of state and
private power and offers the promise, if not the guarantee, that Chinese citizens and other
actors can assert their rights and interests in reliance on law.”).
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whether China’s leaders will tolerate domestic legal reforms that would
bring China’s legal system closer to the liberal model.
Over the course of the past three decades, China has also made some
progress in its understanding of international law and acceptance of the
existing international legal order. Observers no longer read or hear
mainstream Chinese legal experts use phrases such as the pejorative,
Marxist-laden “bourgeois international law.”7 Instead, modern Chinese
legal scholars recognize the importance of all nations, including China,
“understand[ing] and abid[ing] by the rules of the international
community.”8 Perhaps even more importantly, Chinese officials have
9
begun to make more progressive statements about international law.
In October 2006, the legal committee of the United Nations General
Assembly discussed the subject of the rule of law. At that meeting of
legal experts, Mr. Duan Jielong, the Director-General of the Treaty and
Law Department of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave a speech
regarding China’s perspective on international law, during which he
made several significant representations on the subject.10 First, Mr.
Duan said that China’s Government “attaches great importance to the
rule of international law and puts it into actual practice.”11 Then, he
assured the international audience that China’s Government “faithfully
12
Next, he said
fulfills all its obligations under international treaties.”
that China’s Government “strictly abides by the provisions and principles
13
of international law,” and that “relevant international treaties and
principles of international customary law, as well as the binding
decisions adopted by the Security Council should all be strictly adhered
7. JEROME A. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, 1 PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 29 (1974).
8. Wang Zonglai & Hu Bin, China’s Reform and Opening-Up and International
Law, 9 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 193 (2010) (“Since the adoption of the reform and
opening-up policy three decades ago, China’s relations with the world have undergone
historic changes. International law has played a unique role in this process. As no country
can remain completely isolated from the international system in today’s world, it is
imperative for countries to understand and abide by the rules of the international
community.”).
9. For example, Mr. Duan Jielong, the Director-General of the Treaty and Law
Department of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made elaborate statements to the
international community supporting international law and the international legal order.
See Duan Jielong, Statement on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels,
6 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 185 (2007).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 186.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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14
With regard to interpreting
to,” presumably by all nations.
international treaties, Mr. Duan said that “uniform application of
international law should be ensured” and that such uniform application is
“essential for the rule of law at the international level.”15 Such
representations suggested that China has turned a corner in terms of
understanding international law and accepting the existing international
legal order.
A question that the world must consider, however, is whether these
positive assurances by Chinese officials like Mr. Duan reflect a genuine
acceptance of international law and the existing international legal order
or whether such assurances are merely rhetoric. That question will be
the focus of this Article, as viewed through the prism of a particular
subspecialty of international law.
By its nature, international law can create challenges in any effort to
assess whether a particular nation accepts the existing international legal
order. One complication stems from the multiple sources of law that
comprise international law. There is no single source of international
law, rather it is composed of conventional law, customary law, judicial
decisions, and learned treatise.16 Moreover, international law covers a
wide range of activities between nations and organizations, including,
but not limited to, international trade, international armed conflict,
human rights, and environmental protection. Thus, any assessment of a
nation’s acceptance of international law cannot be accomplished with a
single, broad-brush stroke or general characterization. An additional
complication derives from the fact that a particular nation, such as China,
might make a deliberate decision to adhere to certain existing rule-sets of
international law while simultaneously taking a different approach to
other rule-sets.
In general, China has indicated its intent to work within existing
international systems. For example, in a 2007 report, President Hu Jintao
stated that China will “work to make the international order fairer and
more equitable,” implicitly affirming that China will work within the
existing international legal order.17 Similarly, the Assistant Minister of
Foreign Affairs Shen Guofang stated in a 2007 speech that

14. Id. at 187.
15. Id.
16. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 (June 26, 1945), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0.
17. EVAN MEDEIROS, CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR 49 (2009),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf (quoting Hu Jintao).
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China should enhance its ability to determine the agenda and its
ability to make use of the rules by playing a substantive role in
all kinds of consultations and the writing of international rules.
It should show even more initiative in participating in
18
international affairs and in building the multilateral system.
Thus, the world sees China operating within some specific rule-sets of
the international legal order, such as rule-sets governing international
19
trade.
This does not necessarily mean that China has accepted all of the
rule-sets within the greater body of international law. In his insightful
2009 study, China’s International Behavior, China-expert and currentWhite House official Dr. Evan S. Medeiros assessed that “[t]here are
more instances of China gradually accepting international rules than
objecting to and then trying to revise them (and succeeding).”20 Looking
ahead, he further concluded that China is “focused far more on working
within the current rules and institutions to accumulate power and
influence than on opposing and revising them.”21 Ultimately, however,
Medeiros recognized that China does not necessarily accept every ruleset of international law and, additionally, that its actual intent with
respect to some rule-sets is unclear.22 Medeiros concisely framed the
bottom-line question as follows: “does China accept the prevailing rules
or does it seek to rewrite them?”23
This Article considers the Medeiros question for a particular rule-set
of international law—namely, the international law of the sea.
Specifically, it examines China’s rhetoric24 on law of the sea matters in
18. Id. at 42 (quoting Shen Guofeng).
19. Wang & Hu, supra note 8, at 194-95. For an analysis of China’s international
trade behavior within the WTO system, see U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REPORT TO
CONGRESS
ON
CHINA’S
WTO
COMPLIANCE
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3189.
20. MEDEIROS, supra note 17, at 204.
21. Id. at 214.
22. Id. at xxi.
23. Id. at 223.
24. Please note that this Article intentionally focuses upon rhetoric about international
oceans law that has been derived from official statements and publications of the Chinese
government, including articles and editorials in official Chinese newspapers. Some
Chinese writers have criticized U.S. legal scholars for allegedly “misleading” readers
about China’s position on law of the sea matters by referencing unofficial articles written
by Chinese scholars. See, e.g., Zhang Haiwen, Is It Safeguarding the Freedom of
Navigation or Maritime Hegemony of the United States?—Comments on Raul (Pete)
Pedrozo’s Article on Military Activities in the EEZ, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 31, 42 (2010)
(“In order to illustrate the position of China on the EEZ, Pedrozo’s Article (paras.13-15)
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recent years, along with its official actions and the realities of the law of
the sea, and assesses whether China accepts the prevailing rules or seeks
to rewrite them. Part II of this Article identifies some fundamental
realities of the law of the sea, which helps frame the remainder of the
discussion. Part III considers whether China’s policy preferences are
met by those realities, and identifies China’s options for ameliorating any
disconnects between those preferences and realities. Part IV examines
some specific uses of rhetoric by China on law of the sea matters and
evaluates the validity of that rhetoric. Part V discusses some potential
concerns about China’s use of this rhetoric and Part VI provides some
specific recommendations on how China could reassure the world of its
intentions on matters governed by the law of the sea. In the end, this
Article will answer the Medeiros question and conclude whether or not
China accepts this body of international law.
II. FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
Before examining China’s rhetoric about law of the sea matters, let
us first identify some fundamental realities of the law of the sea. These
realities include general truths about the law of the sea, as well as
specific concepts, rules, authority, rights, obligations, responsibilities,
and limitations reflected in that body of law.

refers to two articles of Chinese scholars. Pedrozo neither refers to Chinese official
documents, nor checked the positions expressed by the competent ocean administrative
authorities of the Chinese government or the naval authorities. To base one’s
interpretation of China’s position on such sources reflects inadequate research at best, an
attempt to mislead readers at worst.”). The author of that criticism, Zhang Haiwen, is the
Deputy Director-General of the China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA). Id. at 31
n.31. CIMA is a “research arm” of the State Oceanic Administration (P.R.C.). Sponsors
INST.
OF
OCEANOGRAPHY,
and
Organizers,
SECOND
http://www.sio.org.cn/english/symposium/Organizers_and_Sponsors.asp (last visited
Feb. 11, 2012). Of course, Zhang includes a disclaimer in the introductory footnote of
that article that states: “Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s personal
academic views.” Zhang, supra, at 31 n.31. Ironically, Dr. Zhang either misses a
constructive opportunity or deliberately opts to avoid identifying or cataloging Chinese
official documents that state and justify China’s position on these matters. Thus, in
many situations, outside observers like Professor Pedrozo have no option but to rely upon
what Chinese scholars have written. In order to avoid similar criticism, this Article
attempts to focus upon analyzing only official statements and publications of China.
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A. Law of the Sea as International Law
The law of the sea is a subfield of international law. That reality,
while simple and obvious, carries with it several significant legal effects
that vary depending upon the source of international law, be it
conventional law or customary law.
First, the law of the sea’s status as international law affects how the
law is interpreted. Much of the law of the sea is reflected in the United
25
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Nations must
interpret UNCLOS as they would any other international treaty,
26
convention, or agreement. Specifically, the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties requires nations to interpret rules of international
conventions, including those of UNCLOS, “in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”27 If the ordinary
meaning of a convention’s rule is “ambiguous or obscure,” then nations
may rely upon “supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.”28
These basic rules of treaty interpretation are understandable and prudent:
the text of a treaty or convention often reflects years of intense and
deliberative negotiations between sovereign nations, often involving the
efforts and accommodating the interests of many nations. If the
established rules of treaty interpretation are casually ignored, then one
nation or a discrete minority of nations could upset the will of the
majority of state-parties to a treaty or convention. In effect, a minority
would be able to unilaterally renegotiate the original bargain long after
the parties have all departed the negotiating table.
Second, the law of the sea’s status as international law affects how
the rules of law are modified. As an international convention, UNCLOS
is subject to the standard rules of formation and modification governing
any other treaty, convention, or agreement.29 For example, if a situation
arises that was unforeseen at the time a convention was negotiated, the
parties may negotiate a modification or amendment to the convention—
but those situations require adherence to strict procedures.30 Taken
25. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
26. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
27. Id. art. 31(1).
28. Id. art. 32.
29. Id.
30. Id. arts. 39-41.
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together, these rules of formation, modification, and interpretation of
treaty law are intended to promote “maintenance of international peace
and security, the development of friendly relations and the achievement
31
of cooperation among nations.” In layman’s terms, a single nation may
not casually and unilaterally reinterpret provisions of a treaty or
convention merely because that nation subsequently experiences
“buyer’s remorse.”32
Third, the law of the sea’s status as international law affects how
uncodified, customary rules of law are developed. While much of the
law of the sea is reflected in UNCLOS, an important portion of that body
33
of international law is derived from custom and state practice. In many
ways, customary international law is a reflection of world history.34 This
includes both centuries of world history that predated the negotiation and
conclusion of UNCLOS as well as the three decades of modern history
after its conclusion. The practices of nations—both actions and
inactions—thus shed light on the real meaning of the provisions of
UNCLOS.35 Therefore, if a nation fails to participate or deliberately opts
not to participate in an era of world history, then it is extremely difficult
for that nation to subsequently question or challenge the developments of
customary international law that might have occurred during that period
of time.
B. Specific Rights and Responsibilities of Coastal States and User States
Under the international law of the sea regime, the authority, rights,
obligations, responsibilities, and limitations of individual states are
defined by certain concepts, rules, and tenets that are also worth
identifying at the outset of this discussion.
First, coastal states are entitled to draw baselines along their coasts.36
In general, coastal states must draw their baselines at the low-water line
along their coasts.37 Alternatively, coastal states may draw straight
baselines along their coastlines, but only in four limited situations: (1)
31. Id. at preamble.
32. See Gerald D. Bell, The Automobile Buyer After the Purchase, 31 J. MARKETING
12 (1967), for an explanation of the concept of “buyer’s remorse.”
33. See ROBIN R. CHURCHILL & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 6-11 (Dominic
McGoldrick ed., 3d ed. 1999).
34. See id. at 6-13.
35. See id. at 7-11 (noting that customary international law is reflected in state
practice).
36. UNCLOS, supra note 25, arts. 7-10.
37. Id. art. 5.

2012]

A China in the Bull Shop?

209

38
where the state’s “coastline is deeply indented and cut into,” (2) “if
there is a fringe of islands along the [state’s] coast in its immediate
39
40
vicinity,” (3) “if a river flows directly into the sea,” or (4) if the state
41
has a juridical bay. In these limited situations, however, the “straight
baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
42
direction of the [state’s] coast.” Moreover, there must be a sufficiently
close link between the sea areas lying within the straight baselines and
43
the land domain of the coastal state.
Second, coastal states may claim historic waters only if three criteria
are satisfied.44 One, a coastal state must demonstrate an “effective
45
exercise of sovereignty” over the waters as internal waters. Two, the
coastal state must demonstrate that this exercise of authority in the
waters has been continuous “during a considerable time so as to have
developed into a usage.”46 Three, the coastal state must demonstrate that
the claim has received the “general toleration” or “acquiescence” of other
states.47 If any of these criteria are not satisfied, the coastal state lacks a
legitimate basis under international law to assert a claim of historic
48
waters.
Third, warships of user states enjoy the right of innocent passage
49
through the territorial seas of a coastal state. UNCLOS recognizes that
ships of “all States enjoy a right of innocent passage.”50 Moreover, that
right is enjoyed by “all ships,”51 including vessels and submarines52 that
are capable of engaging in military-unique activities. It therefore follows
that the right of innocent passage also is afforded to military vessels—so

38. Id. art. 7(1).
39. Id.
40. Id. art. 9.
41. Id. art.10.
42. Id. art. 7(3).
43. Id.
44. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, [1964] 2 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1962/Add.1, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1962_v2_e.pdf. See also CHURCHILL &
LOWE, supra note 33, at 43-44.
45. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, supra note 44, at
25.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 25-26.
49. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 17.
50. Id. art. 17.
51. See id. arts. 17-26.
52. Id. art. 20.
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long as those transiting vessels do not engage in military activities while
53
In fact, UNCLOS
passing through the coastal state’s territorial seas.
enumerates a specific set of rules for innocent passage that is applicable
to warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes.54 Although coastal states may suspend temporarily the right of
innocent passage, they may not discriminate “in form or in fact among
foreign ships” when exercising their suspension power.55 Finally,
coastal states may not “impose requirements on foreign ships which have
the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent
passage.”56
Fourth, coastal states have some limited authority to control
57
In particular, coastal states may
activities in their contiguous zones.
exercise control to prevent infringement of four—and only four—
categories of laws and regulations: customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitary.58 Of note, these categories do not include an authority to
generally exercise control necessary for “security.”59
Fifth, coastal states do not enjoy “sovereignty” in their exclusive
60
economic zones like they do in their territorial seas and internal waters.
Instead, coastal states only enjoy “sovereign rights” in their exclusive
61
62
economic zones. These sovereign rights are not unlimited in nature,
but instead, are confined to “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources . . . with
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of
the zone . . . .”63 As indicated by the plain language of the name itself,
the zone is an exclusive economic zone—not an exclusive security zone
64
In fact, when some nations at the
or an exclusive military zone.
UNCLOS negotiations attempted to insert an enforceable “security

53. Id. art. 19(2) (the list of activities includes: using force, exercising or practicing
weapons, collecting intelligence, transmitting propaganda, launching, landing or taking
on board aircraft, launching, landing, or taking on board any military device, or jamming
communication systems of the coastal state).
54. Id. arts. 29-32.
55. Id. art. 25(3).
56. Id. art. 24(1)(a).
57. Id. art. 33.
58. Id. art. 33(a).
59. See id.
60. See id. arts. 2, 56.
61. Id. art. 56.
62. See id. art. 55.
63. Id. art. 56(1).
64. See id. Part V.
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interest” into the exclusive economic zone regime, that proposal was
65
deliberately considered and rejected by the nations assembled.
Sixth, user states may conduct military activities in the exclusive
economic zones of coastal states.66 For centuries of world history,
nations have enjoyed freedom of the seas beyond the territorial seas of
any coastal state.67 These freedoms have included the collecting of
65. II United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary 558560 (Satya N. Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne, eds. 2002); see also Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Jam., Note by the Secretariat, 243-4,
U.N.
DOC.
A/CONF.
62/WS/37
(Dec.
10
1982),
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea1982/docs/vol_XVII/a_conf-62_ws_37%20and%20add-1%20and%202.pdf
(“This [exclusive economic zone] concept, as set forth in the Convention, recognizes the
interest of the coastal State in the resources of the zone and authorizes it to assert
jurisdiction over resource-related activities therein. At the same time, all States continue
to enjoy in the zone traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea
related to these freedoms, which remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those
freedoms when exercised seaward of the zone. Military operations, exercises and
activities have always been regarded as internationally lawful uses of the sea. The right to
conduct such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all States in the exclusive
economic zone. This is the import of article 58 of the Convention.”).
66. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art 58(1).
67. See William J. Clinton, Message From the President of the United States: Letter of
Transmittal, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39, at 3-4 (1994), reprinted in 6 BUREAU OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 6 DISPATCH SUPPLEMENT, SUPP. 1 (1995),
http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/Senate_Transmittal.pdf
[hereinafter
Clinton, UNCLOS Transmittal]; see also 66 J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH,
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1994: EXCESSIVE MARITIME
CLAIMS 242 (1994); Raul “Pete” Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms:
The Right to Conduct Military Activities in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone, 9 CHINESE
J. OF INT’L L. 9, 14 (2010) [hereinafter Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights].
Similarly, military surveillance ships have historically collected intelligence
seaward of the territorial sea as a matter of routine. During the Cold War, for
example, Soviet surveillance ships (AGI) routinely collected intelligence on US
and NATO warships at sea. Such surveillance activities were lawful and
acceptable to the Alliance so long as they occurred seaward of the territorial sea
and the AGIs complied with the obligations of the 1972 International Regulations
for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) and the 1972 US–USSR Agreement
on the Prevention of Incidents on the High Seas (INCSEA). . . . Military aircraft
have likewise flown thousands of missions beyond national airspace since the
advent of aviation, to include intelligence collection missions and military
exercises along the outer edge of the territorial sea. These activities were
commonplace during the Cold War and continue today without the consent of the
coastal States concerned. For instance, from May 2007 to May 2008, Russian TU95 Bear bombers conducted operational flights just outside the 12-nm limit off
Alaska and Canada on many occasions. US and Canadian fighters intercepted and
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68
intelligence and the conducting of surveillance by militaries. The text
of UNCLOS expressly provides user states with the freedoms of
navigation and overflight and “other internationally lawful uses of the
sea related to these freedoms.”69 Additionally, that same provision
includes the language “such as,” a phrase the ordinary meaning of which
70
denotes examples, but not necessarily an exhaustive list. To that end, it
was “the general understanding” of the UNCLOS negotiators that this
language would permit “foreign military activities” in the exclusive
economic zones of coastal states.71 During the three decades of modern

monitored the bombers, but each time the Russian aircraft were allowed to
continue on their way.
Id. at 14-15.
68. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 67, at 242.
69. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 58(1).
70. Id. See Elliot L. Richardson, Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea, 58 FOREIGN
AFF. 902, 916 (1980) (In order to carry out the qualitative aspect of this understanding,
the text identifies the safeguarded freedoms as those ‘referred to in Article 87,’ which is
the article on “Freedom of the High Seas.” The quantitative aspect is satisfied by the
phrase ‘such as,’ which makes clear that the reference to specific uses is illustrative but
not exhaustive. Article 87 similarly defines ‘freedom of the high seas’ by setting forth a
non-exhaustive list of freedoms.). Ambassador Richardson was the head of the U.S.
Delegation to the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. Id. at 902. Of note, he
was the originator of the “other internationally lawful uses of the seas related to these
freedoms, such as” language that was ultimately codified in the final text of Article 58(1).
See Jorge Casteneda, Negotiations on the Exclusive Economic Zone at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR
OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHS 603 (1984).
The maritime powers’ misgivings, concerning the restrictive character of the
phrase ‘other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to navigation and
communications,’ were dispelled through the inclusion of a new formulation,
proposed by the representatives of the U.S., Ambassador Elliot Richardson, which
reads as follows: “Other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these
freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and
submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of the
Convention.”
Id. at 622. Ambassador Castaneda was the head of the Mexico delegation to the Third
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 302-03 (Jon M. Van Dyke ed., 1984)
[hereinafter CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION].
71. CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 70, at 302-303.
Koh: The question of military activities in the exclusive economic zone is a very
difficult one. Bernie Oxman will remember that the status of the exclusive
economic zone was one of the last questions to be wrapped up in the negotiations
in Committee Two. We finally succeeded in wrapping up this question of the
status of the exclusive economic zone thanks to the personal initiative of our friend
Jorge Castaneda of Mexico. Before he became foreign minister, he was the leader
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history after the negotiation of UNCLOS, naval forces of the world have
continued to conduct non-economic, military activities beyond the
territorial seas of any coastal state, including within the exclusive
72
Consequently, an
economic zones of those coastal states.
overwhelming majority of nations in the world have either openly
supported this freedom of the seas or taken no state action to restrict
foreign military activities in their respective exclusive economic zones.73
III. FACED WITH THESE REALITIES, CHINA OPTS FOR RHETORIC
The realities of international law, including the law of the sea, do not
support many of China’s desired positions. In other words, the meaning
and intent of many key provisions of UNCLOS are not what China
wishes they were, and the status of customary law of the sea is not where
China wants it to be. For example, China wants to be able to draw

of the Mexican delegation. In 1977, I believe, Jorge Castaneda invited about 20 of
us to dinner one evening. After dinner was over, he asked that the table be cleared
and said, “Ladies and gentlemen, we have been grappling for the last three years
with the question of the status of the exclusive economic zone. I have invited you
here because I believe you represent a cross section of the points of view of the
Conference and you are the leaders of the Conference. I suggest, if you all agree,
that we commence informal consultations on this question.” We agreed and sat
down and worked, in fact, all night long. And we began to negotiate every night
for two weeks and eventually wrapped up the issue. The solution in the
Convention text is very complicated. Nowhere is it clearly stated whether a third
state may or may not conduct military activities in the exclusive economic zone of
a coastal state. But, it was the general understanding that the text we negotiated
and agreed upon would permit such activities to be conducted. I therefore would
disagree with the statement made in Montego Bay by Brazil, in December 1982,
that a third state may not conduct military activities in Brazil’s exclusive economic
zone.
Id. at 302-03 (quoting Ambassador Tommy Koh) (emphasis added). Ambassador Koh
from Singapore was the second and final president of the Third U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea, presiding over the conclusion of the UNCLOS text; he made that
statement a mere thirteen months after the final text of UNCLOS was concluded.
72. See Captain Raul Pedrozo, Close Encounters at Sea: the USNS Impeccable
Incident, 62 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 101, 102 (2009).
73. For a collection of Declarations and Statements issued by coastal states upon
acceding to UNCLOS, see U.N. Div. of Oceans Aff. and the Law of the Sea, Declarations
and
Statements
(July
12,
2011),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/
convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm [hereinafter Declarations and
Statements]. For a summary of these national maritime claims by coastal states
throughout the world, see U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD 2005. 1-M, MARITIME CLAIMS
REFERENCE MANUAL (2005) [hereinafter MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL].
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74
straight baselines along its entire coastline and claim the significant
amounts of resulting enclosed waters as off-limits to the ships of other
75
Additionally, China wants to be able to draw straight
nations.
baselines around the Paracel Islands and claim even more internal
76
waters. Still unsatisfied, China wants “indisputable sovereignty” and
“historic rights” over eighty percent of the South China Sea with its nine
unexplained dashes.77 Regarding the rights, freedoms, and uses of the
sea, China wishes that foreign warships did not have the right of innocent
78
79
passage. China also wants to control security in its contiguous zone.

74. See Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the
Baselines of the Territorial Sea (May 15, 1996) http://www.un.org/depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1996_Declaration.pdf (last visited
Feb. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Declaration on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea].
75. Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 25, 1992, effective Feb. 25, 1992), art. 2, available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383846.htm
[hereinafter
Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone].
76. Declaration on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea, supra note 74.
77. See Letter from Permanent Mission of China to H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-Moon,
Secretary-General, United Nations (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/
depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf; see
Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 26, 1998, effective June 26, 1998, art. 14,
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383573.htm
(“The provisions in this Law shall not affect the rights that the People’s Republic of
China has been enjoying ever since the days of the past.”).
78. See Tao Cheng, Communist China and the Law of the Sea, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 47,
63 (1969) (The 1958 Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea “requires permission for
foreign vessels to exercise the right of innocent passage” whereas “the Geneva
Convention [on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958] does not.”); see
also Yann-Huei “Billy” Song, China and the Military Use of the Ocean, 20 OCEAN DEV.
& INT’L L. 213, 216 (1990).
Because of failure to make passage of warships through territorial sea dependent
on the coastal states’ prior notification or authorization as well as because of the
adoption of a provision giving “ships” as such in general the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea in the 1977 Informal Composite Negotiating
Text, Shen Wei-liang, chairman of the Chinese delegation to the seventh session of
the UNCLOS III, stated that “[T]he system of passage in territorial seas is an
important and fundamental issue relating to the coastal states” sovereignty and
security. All kinds of regulations in that regard must ensure that the sovereignty of
the coastal state is not infringed and security not threatened. For the sake of the
convenience for international trade, a system of innocent passage basically can be
accepted. However, it is up to the decision of the coastal states, based on its laws
and regulations, whether to entitle military vessels the right of innocent passage
through the territorial seas. Without giving prior notification or receiving the
coastal states “laws and regulations, the passage of foreign warships through the
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territorial sea constructs an act of infringement on the coastal states’ independence
and security, which can never be permitted.” During the final stages of UNCLOS
III, the Chinese delegates continued to propose the incorporation of the
requirement of prior notification and authorization into the draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea, but without avail.
Id. See also Declarations and Statements, supra note 73; Law on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, supra note 75, art. 6; JEANETTE GREENFIELD, CHINA AND THE LAW OF
THE SEA, AIR, AND ENVIRONMENT 38-39 (1979) (“Chinese representatives have been
adamant concerning this principle of non-innocent passage for military vessels through
territorial seas and particularly straits, and all statements indicate a resolute intention
never to compromise it.”); Michael Carr, China and the Law of the Sea Convention, 9
AUSTL. J. OF CHINESE AFF. 35, 35-36 (1983).
Section 3 of the Convention clearly recognizes the right of all ships, including
warships, to “innocent passage” through the territorial sea. Passage is innocent so
long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, order or security of the coastal state
(Article 19). China, however, takes a more restrictive view of this right of
navigation. Foreign non-military vessels can have the right of innocent passage
but “must observe the relevant laws and regulations laid down by the Government
of the People’s Republic of China.” Foreign military vessels must obtain prior
authorization for passage. . . . That the passage of warships may be innocent was
clearly established by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case;
the Chinese maintain, however, that from the point of view of security this is never
so. . . . It is clear that the Chinese are unlikely to concede the right of innocent
passage of warships through their territorial sea. However, if they sign and then
ratify the Convention, they will have to reconcile their stand on this issue with
their newly assumed international obligations.
Id. at 37-38. See also Zhiguo Gao, China and the Law of the Sea, in FREEDOM OF SEAS,
PASSAGE RIGHTS, AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 273, 284-85 (Myron H.
Nordquist, Tommy K.B. Koh & John Norton Moore, eds., 2009) (“It is China’s view that
only non-military vessels were entitled to the right of innocent passage; no consensus had
been reached on the innocent passage of warships.” Additionally, “[a] Chinese writer
recently asserted that the general customary rule on the passage of warships through the
territorial sea is: ‘Coastal States may grant foreign warships innocent passage through the
territorial sea without special requirements or make the passage subject to previous
notification or authorization, or to some other requirements.’” While “[t]his assertion
may be true in theory and practice[,]” it is nevertheless “contrary to the provisions of
UNCLOS” and “[t]herefore poses a major problem for China if it wishes to stay within
the framework of the Convention.”). Of note, at the time Gao wrote this chapter, he was
the Executive Director of the China Institute for Marine Affairs, a research arm of
China’s State Oceanic Administration. Currently, Gao is a judge on the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. See Judge Zhiguo Gao, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR LAW OF
THE SEA, http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=92 (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
79. Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 75, art. 13; Carr,
supra note 78, at 41.
China was an early supporter of such a zone, and also recognized claims for the
establishment of extensive zones for such purposes as peace and security. These
zones would have represented an infringement of the rights of innocent passage
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China wishes that a coastal state enjoyed sovereignty of its exclusive
economic zone equivalent to that which it enjoys over its territorial seas
80
China
and internal waters, versus merely having sovereignty rights.
also wishes that coastal states enjoyed legally-protected and enforceable
81
security interests in their respective exclusive economic zones. Finally,
China wishes that it enjoyed 200 nautical mile territorial seas,82 that
other states enjoyed only a limited freedom of passage through its
83
exclusive economic zone, and that other states be prohibited from
conducting military activities in its exclusive economic zone.84

and transit passage and of the doctrine of freedom of the high seas and were
rejected by the [Third U.N.] Conference.
Id.
80. See, e.g., Violation of China’s Sovereignty Never Allowed, CHINADAILY.COM.CN,
Mar. 10, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/10/content_7564839.htm
(This article reported the following statement by Major General Wang Dengping’s, the
political commissar of the Armament Department of the People’s Liberation Army Navy,
regarding the USNS Impeccable incident: “It is our sovereignty for Chinese vessels to
conduct activities in the country’s special economic zone, and such activities are
justified.”). For more information on the USNS Impeccable incident, see generally
Jonathan G. Odom, The True “Lies” of The Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened,
Who Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) Should
be Concerned, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 411 (2010).
81. See Spokesman Zhu Bangzao Gives Full Account of the Collision between US and
Chinese Military planes, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERV., Apr. 4, 2001,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/20010404/393124A.htm.
82. GREENFIELD, supra note 78, at 56 (“While having always stressed the distance of
twelve miles in respect of [China’s] own territorial waters, [China] has continued to
support a maximum breadth of two hundred miles.”); Carr, supra note 78, at 35-36.
83. See, e.g., Violation of China’s Sovereignty Never Allowed, supra note 80
(Regarding the issue of foreign military activities, Major General Wang stated, “Innocent
passage by naval vessels from other countries in the territorial waters in the special
economic zone is acceptable, but not allowed otherwise.”); see also Huang Zuoping,
REVIEW,
June
7,
2009,
Troubled
Waters,
BEIJING
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2009-06/07/content_199369.htm
(“These
navigation rights refer to ‘innocent passage,’ on which point the U.S. Navy obviously
cannot stand. Therefore, it is necessary and perfectly justifiable for China to dispel U.S.
Navy surveillance ships from its EEZs to protect its marine environment and resources.”).
84. Ma Zhaoxu, Spokesman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (P.R.C.), Regular Press
Conference, Mar. 10, 2009, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t541713.htm
(“[Engaging] in activities in China’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea
without China’s permission, [the US navy surveillance ship] broke the international law
as well as Chinese laws and regulations.”); see also China Opposes Any Military Acts in
Its Exclusive Economic Zone Without Permission, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERV., Nov.
26, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-11/26/c_13624036.htm
(quoting Hong Lei, Spokesman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (P.R.C.) as saying “We hold
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Recognizing the significant number of disconnects between reality
and China’s preferences, the question becomes: What are China’s
options for realizing its goals?
One option, since foreclosed, would have been for China to decline
binding itself as a signatory to UNCLOS. A fundamental principle of
85
international law is that treaties are based upon the “free consent” of
the parties—no nation can be forced to enter a particular treaty or
86
In fact, not every nation in the world is a party to
convention.
UNCLOS.87 China, however, chose the path of compromise and
voluntarily ratified UNCLOS in 1996.88 This decision, while laudable,
does not ipso facto immunize China from criticism when it acts
inconsistent with the terms of the convention. To the contrary, China’s
ratification of UNCLOS increases the international community’s
expectations that China will abide by its terms.
A second option, also now foreclosed, would have been for China to
submit declarations upon ratifying UNCLOS that addressed its
disconnects with the UNCLOS regime. Although UNCLOS, unlike
many other treaties and conventions,89 expressly prohibits member-states
from submitting reservations upon ratification,90 it does permit the
91
Thus, many nations have
submission of declarations or statements.

a consistent and clear-cut stance on the issue. We oppose any party to take any military
acts in our exclusive economic zone without permission.”); Zuoping, supra note 83.
85. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 26, at preamble.
86. Id. art. 52.
87. For a list of the 162 nations that have acceded to UNCLOS, see U.N. Div. For
Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and
successions to the Convention and the related Agreements as at 03 June 2011, UN.ORG,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm last
visited Apr. 16 2012). Nations that have not yet acceded to UNCLOS include:
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Iran, Ireland, Lichtenstein,
Niger, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United States. Id. The United States,
however, has long considered the legal regime reflected in UNCLOS to be customary
law. See Statement on United States Ocean Policy, 1 Pub. Papers 378, 378-79 (Mar. 10,
1983).
88. See Gao, supra note 78, at 278 (“Due to the comprehensiveness of the LOS
Convention and its spirit of compromise, no State is completely satisfied with all the
provisions. Every country has to cede on one point before gaining on another. So despite
its dissatisfaction with some of the articles to the Convention, China ratified it in 1996.”);
Declarations Upon Ratification of UNCLOS (P.R.C.) (June 7, 1996),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China.
89. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 26, art. 19.
90. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 309.
91. Id. art. 310.
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submitted declarations at their respective times of accession.
Unfortunately, some of those declarations look very similar to
reservations and, therefore, have questionable effect. In fact, China
submitted several declarations at the time it joined UNCLOS, including
one regarding the right of innocent passage afforded to foreign
warships.93 That notwithstanding, China failed to submit declarations on
other significant issues, including attempts to restrict foreign military
activities in China’s exclusive economic zone94 as a handful of other
states have done.95 Recently, PRC officials have started to use rhetoric,
such as “[w]e hold a consistent and clear-cut stance on the issue,”96
implying that China’s position on the issue of foreign military activities
in its exclusive economic zone has been long-standing. In reality,
however, China did not publicly adopt that stance until years after it
97
In essence, despite China’s affinity for past
acceded to UNCLOS.
events over a span of 5,000 years, it does not acknowledge the legal
significance of events over the past forty years in world history and
international law—including its actions and, in this case, inaction.
A third option is for China to pursue the invalidation of UNCLOS.
Less than a century ago, China waged a rhetorical battle of invalidation
on a significant number of bilateral treaties and conventions that it had
entered into during the 1800s. Believing these agreements to be
unfavorable to China’s interests, China successfully employed the novel

92. See Declarations Upon Ratification of UNCLOS, supra note 88.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. For example, Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Uruguay
submitted Declarations at the time of their accession to UNCLOS that claimed the right
to restrict military activities in their respective exclusive economic zones; however,
Germany, Italy, and Netherlands submitted Declarations that coastal states lacked the
right to do so. Id.
96. China Opposes Any Military Acts in Its Exclusive Economic Zone Without
Permission, supra note 86 (Quoting Hong Lei, Spokesman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(P.R.C.).
97. During the negotiations of UNCLOS, China was apparently silent on the specific
issue of foreign military activities in a coastal state’s exclusive economic zone. See, e.g.,
Carr, supra note 78, at 40 (“The nature of this exclusive jurisdiction has been defined by
China as ‘the right of the coastal States to protect, use and exploit all the natural
resources in the zone, to adopt necessary measures and regulations to prevent those
resources being plundered, encroached on, damaged or polluted, and to exercise overall
control and regulation of the marine environment and scientific research within the
zone.’”); see also Brian Wilson, An Avoidable Maritime Conflict: Disputes Regarding
Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 41 J. OF MAR. L. & COMMERCE 421,
429-30 (2010).
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98
doctrine of “unfair treaties” to abandon them. However, the likelihood
of success in a similar battle against UNCLOS is drastically lower.
Unlike the “unfair treaties” of the 1800s, UNCLOS is not a bilateral
agreement, but rather a multilateral one with 162 other state-parties
whom China would need to convince of its invalidity. Politically,
international relations during the 1920s are significantly different than
modern international relations. Assuming arguendo that China was an
“unequal party” at the time of the 19th century agreements, China is
hardly an “unequal party” with respect to UNCLOS. The multilateral
agreement reached in UNCLOS was not a forced deal between unequal
nations, but rather the result of equal bargaining among participating
nations of all sizes and influence. Consequently, China would be hard
pressed to resurrect its “unfair treaty” strategy from the 1920s and
invalidate UNCLOS on such grounds, without generating further
international concern over whether China accepts the existing
international legal order.
A fourth option is for China to unilaterally withdrawal from
UNCLOS. Just as entering a treaty or convention is based upon the “free
consent” of the parties, international law affords state-parties the right to
withdraw from a particular treaty or convention.99 By the express terms
of UNCLOS, the right of denunciation is available to state-parties.100
However, China is highly unlikely to denunciate, as this too would
generate further international concern over whether China truly accepts
the existing international legal order.
A fifth option is for China to pursue amending UNCLOS. Like the
standard procedures for amending other treaties and conventions,101
UNCLOS fully contemplated that the Convention might need to be
modified in the future.102 By the express terms of the Convention, a
party may propose specific amendments and request the convening of a
103
If less than a
conference to consider such proposed amendments.
majority of UNCLOS state-parties (currently, 82 of 162) do not reply
favorably within twelve months of a proposed amendment, then the U.N.
Secretary-General will not convene a conference to consider the
proposed amendments.104 Because fewer than eighty-two state-parties

98. For a comprehensive discussion of this historical movement, see generally DONG
WANG, CHINA’S UNEQUAL TREATIES: NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY (2005).
99. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 27, arts. 54, 56.
100. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 317.
101. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 32.
102. See UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 312.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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105
it is
support China’s preferences on these law of the sea matters,
unlikely that China could succeed in having any proposed amendments
to UNCLOS seriously considered.
With these five options off the table, China appears to be pursuing a
sixth option. This option consists of using rhetoric designed to allow
China to retain the benefits of the provisions it likes, while repudiating
those it does not. For those UNCLOS rules that China dislikes but
cannot legally or politically reserve-, declare-, invalidate-, withdraw-, or
amend-away, it must create and encourage doubt in the meaning of those
rules. Accordingly, China argues that the text of UNCLOS is flawed.
For example, at the final session of UNCLOS negotiations, the head of
China’s delegation stated that “[t]here are still quite a number of articles
in the Convention which are imperfect or even have serious drawbacks.
We are not entirely satisfied with the Convention.”106 More recently, in
regard to the exclusive economic zone regime, China has argued that the
regime has “shortcomings” that lead to “unclear and differing
conceptions,”107 implying that these shortcomings should be perfected
through other means. Whether this sixth option of legal rhetoric is
acceptable is discussed later in this Article. But first, let us examine

105. See MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 73.
106. Paul C. Yuan, The New Convention on the Law of the Sea from the Chinese
Perspective, in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF
THE SEA CONVENTION 185 (Jon M. Van Dyke ed., 1985) (citing PEOPLE’S DAILY,
December 11, 1982, at 2); see also Gao, supra note 78, at 277 (“The head of the Chinese
delegation pointed out at the final session that ‘there are quite a number of articles in the
LOS Convention which are imperfect or even have serious drawbacks.’”).
107. See Ren Xiaofeng & Cheng Xizhong, A Chinese Perspective, 29 MARINE POL’Y
139, 139 (2005). Earlier, the author indicated that rhetoric would be derived from official
statements and publications of China’s Government. See supra note 24. Throughout the
remainder of this Article, the Ren and Cheng article will be assumed to be an official
perspective of China’s Government for several valid reasons. First, at the time of
publication, both authors were members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Specifically, Dr. Ren was a Senior Captain in the PLA Navy, while Cheng was a Senior
Colonel in the PLA. Of note, Senior Captain Ren has served as the legal advisor to many
Chinese delegations for many official international meetings regarding law of the sea
matters. Second, unlike some articles and publications by Chinese authors who are
coincidentally employees of the Chinese Government, this 2005 article does not include a
disclaimer that the authors are writing in only their personal capacities. Third, during an
international law conference hosted by U.S. Pacific Command several years ago, when a
panel discussion on law of the sea matters included a presentation on the 2001 EP-3
incident in the South China Sea, Chinese attendees at the conference distributed a copy of
the Ren and Cheng article to the attendees as the one source of information representing
the Chinese position.
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some of the specific rhetoric China has employed regarding the law of
the sea since its accession to UNCLOS in 1996.
IV. SPECIFIC ISSUES OF CHINA’S RHETORIC ON
LAW OF THE SEA MATTERS
It would be easy to simply accuse China of not complying with
international law or not accepting the existing international legal order.
It might be more worthwhile, however, to consider whether what China
says about the law of the sea matches up with the reality of what China
believes, what other nations believe and do, and what the law of the sea
actually means. Accordingly, this Part compares what China says to the
world with what it says internally to Chinese audiences; considers
whether, as China alleges, the United States is singling China out for
criticism on law of the sea matters; evaluates whether China’s words and
actions on law of the sea matters are truly consistent with one another,
especially regarding freedom of navigation; and analyzes whether China
is sufficiently transparent on law of the sea matters and can be trusted on
these matters.
A. The Real China Is Revealed “At Home”
A disparity sometimes exists between rhetoric and reality in some
types of relations, including personal relations such as marriage. The
author once heard a Navy chaplain tell a room full of married couples,
“[w]e are who we are when we are at home.”108 What he meant was that
while married couples often hold out a polished image of themselves to
the public, the reality of the relationship is revealed through couples’
behavior and statements to one another inside the sanctuary of their own
homes.
Likewise, a similar disparity can exist between rhetoric and reality in
international relations. For China, a potential disparity exists between
what China says to the world and what China really thinks about
international law, including the law of the sea. Although there is
admittedly some value to examining the rhetorical words of China’s
leaders spoken to the world to see what it thinks about international law,
including the law of the sea, the true measure of reality is what China
says within its national “household” on that same subject. An optimist
would compare the PRC’s dismissive attitude towards “bourgeois
108. Lieutenant Commander Richard Bonnette, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy, Remarks
at CREDO Marriage Enrichment Retreat (Jan. 19, 2001).
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international law” in the 1960s and 1970s to its more recent statements
109
on the subject, like those made by Mr. Duan in 2006, and see progress.
But, a realist would caution the world to not compare such positive
words only with words spoken by a China that was closed off to the
world in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Instead, the world should compare
China’s recent public statements to international audiences on matters of
international law with what China has recently offered for consumption
to its own internal audiences on that same subject.
With respect to the statements China has made regarding
international law within the comfort of its “home,” the world should
consider what China’s military leaders have taught their rank and file
officers. For example, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) handbook
on international law instructs PLA officers that, “[t]he Chinese
government is . . . obliged to adhere strictly to all international laws . . .
.”110 But three pages later, that same official publication admonishes its
officers to “be flexible in the application of international laws.”111 It
explains
in practice, while we should adhere to the fundamental principles
and relevant regulations contained in international laws, we
should not feel completely bound by specific articles and
stipulations detrimental to the defense of our national interests.
We should therefore always apply international laws flexibly in
the defense of our national interests and dignity, appealing to
those aspects beneficial to our country while evading those
detrimental to our interests.112
Such internal direction for selective compliance of international law calls
into question the sincerity of Director General Duan’s statements to the
United Nations about strict adherence to international law.
Statements by China’s national leadership to the legal experts within
the Chinese Communist Party are also telling. At a 1996 seminar on
international law, then-President Jiang Zemin addressed his comrades in
attendance in a manner consistent with the Chinese Communist’s longstanding perspective of law as an instrument of state policy and

109. Duan Jielong, Statement on the Rule of Law at the National and International
Levels, 6 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 185, 185-88 (2007).
110. BASICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MODERN SOLDIERS 3 (Zhao Peiying ed., 1996)
(P.R.C.).
111. Id. at 6.
112. Id.

2012]

A China in the Bull Shop?

223

113
Jiang Zemin
international law as an instrument of foreign policy.
urged, “[o]ur leaders and cadres, especially those of high rank, ought to
take note of international law and enhance their skills in applying it . . . .
We must be adept at using international law as ‘a weapon’ to defend the
114
Although President
interests of our state and maintain national pride.”
Jiang’s words about “using international law as a weapon” might have
been merely use of rhetoric,115 the PLA has since turned that rhetoric
into a strategic reality.
Since 2003, the PLA has been operationalizing a doctrinal concept it
has named “Legal Warfare.”116 Consistent with former-President Jiang’s

113. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 7, at 32 (“During the anti-rightist campaign, for
example, an article published in the authoritative People’s Daily, the newspaper of the
Chinese Communist Party, stated: ‘International law is one of the instruments for settling
international problems. If this instrument is useful to our country, to the socialist cause,
or to the cause of peace of the people of the world, we will use it. However, if this
instrument is disadvantageous to our country, to the socialist cause, or to the cause of
peace of the people of the world, we will not use it and should create a new instrument to
replace it’”); GREENFIELD, supra note 78, at 6 (“Since the establishment of the People’s
Republic emphasis has been given to Marxist-Leninist concept of law as an instrument of
State policy, and international law as an instrument of foreign policy.”); Carr, supra note
78, at 35-36 (“In considering China’s stance on the various issues which arose during the
[Third U.N.] Conference [on the Law of the Sea] it is important to bear in mind that since
the establishment of the People’s Republic emphasis has been given to Marxist-Leninist
concept of law as an instrument of state policy, and international law as an instrument of
foreign policy. China regards the concept of state sovereignty as the most fundamental
principle of international law, and this attitude clearly emerges in its approach to some of
the issues considered here.”); Yuan, supra note 101, at 185, 198 (“China does not stress
the distinction between law and politics as Western nations do. In the United States,
there are so many law schools and law is separated from politics. In China, however,
when we establish a law school, it is a political-legal institution, and students must study
Marxism. The name of the school is usually School of Law and Politics—China regards
the two as inseparable.”).
114. WANG, supra note 98, at 128 (emphasis added). See also Jiang Zemin Urges
International Law Studies, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (P.R.C.), Dec. 9, 1996 (“Chinese
President and Communist Party of China (CPC) General Secretary Jiang Zemin today
called on leading cadres, especially those at high levels, to study international law and
improve their ability to use these rules. Jiang urged cadres to utilize international law” in
a variety of fields and emphasized the importance of employing international law “to
safeguard China’s national interests and dignity so that the country can take the initiative
in international cooperation and competition, when presiding at a lecture on international
law.”).
115. WANG, supra note 98, at 126.
116. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 26 (2011),
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS].
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call to use international law as a weapon, one of the PLA’s official
textbooks, Under Informatized Conditions: Legal Warfare, defines
“Legal Warfare” to include “activities conducted by using the law as the
weapon and through measures and methods such as legal deterrence,
legal attack, legal counterattack, legal restraint, legal sanctions, and legal
117
The textbook further discusses “legal restraint” in terms
protections.”
of “shrink[ing] enemy’s political space” and “restrain[ing] and limit[ing]
118
enemy’s combat operations” —implying that China should use law to
restrain the actions of others nations geospatially, as in the maritime and
air domains. In fact, the PLA textbook then expressly notes that Legal
Warfare “involves” the “international laws of . . . the ocean.”119
Additionally, the textbook specifically identifies domestic maritime laws,
such as China’s “Laws of Territorial Waters and Their Adjacent Areas,”
that also serve as the “armory of legal warfare.”120
The stark contrast between China’s external rhetoric, that it is strictly
bound by international law, and its internal guidance, that it must use
“international law as a weapon”121 and that the PLA should not “feel
completely bound by specific articles” of international law,122 reveals
China’s true thoughts on international law.123 When the world witnesses
China’s military leaders indoctrinating its military forces with notions
that the international law of the ocean and China’s maritime and other
domestic laws form the “armory of legal warfare,”124 the world begins to
detect the reality of Chinese strategy in the law of the sea arena. And
what the world sees is a strategy designed to control and deny other
nations’ lawful access to the waters of the Western Pacific.

117. UNDER INFORMATIZED CONDITIONS: LEGAL WARFARE 7 (Song Yunxia ed., 2007)
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter UNDER INFORMATIZED CONDITIONS] (emphasis added). See also, Jin
Hongbing, Legal Warfare: Sharp Tool to Seize the Opportunity to Grab the Initiative,
RENMIN HAIJUN [PEOPLE’S NAVY], May 29, 2006 (“Legal warfare refers to using law as a
weapon and adopting methods and means including legal intimidation, legal attacks, legal
counterattacks, legal restraint, legal sanctions, and legal protection to compete for
political initiative and legal superiority according to the strategic needs of the country and
military combat missions.”).
118. UNDER INFORMATIZED CONDITIONS, supra note 117, at 124.
119. Id. at 23.
120. Id. at 24.
121. WANG, supra note 98, at 128.
122. BASICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MODERN SOLDIERS, supra note 104, at 6.
123. WANG, supra note 98, at 126.
124. UNDER INFORMATIZED CONDITIONS, supra note 117, at 24.
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B. It’s Bigger Than China
In the past two years, senior leaders of the U.S. Government have
125
made a series of statements about the law of the sea in East Asia,
some of which have been subjected to rhetorical criticism by senior
leaders of the PRC Government. For example, U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton delivered remarks at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum
meeting that called for nations to respect international law and preserve
freedom of navigation.126 In response, China’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Yang Jiechi, issued a statement which characterized Clinton’s
statements as “seemingly impartial remarks” that “were in effect an
attack on China.”127 To the contrary, the U.S. interest in upholding the
law of the sea is global and long-standing—and much bigger than China.
In fact, the United States has upheld the law of the sea since the
nation’s founding and consistently thereafter, including in oceans and
seas distant from U.S. shores. During the first half-century of U.S.
history, there were “depredations” against U.S. commercial shipping in
125. See President Barack Obama, Press Conference with President Obama and
President Hu of the People’s Republic of China (Jan. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/press-conference-presidentobama-and-president-hu-peoples-republic-china (President Barack Obama stated, “[w]ith
regard to regional stability and security in East Asia, I stressed [to President Hu] that the
United States has a fundamental interest in maintaining freedom of navigation,
unimpeded commerce, respect for international law and the peaceful resolution of
differences.”); see also Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Comments by Secretary
Clinton in Hanoi, Vietnam (July 23, 2010) [hereinafter Clinton, Hanoi Remarks],
available
at
http://www.america.gov/
st/texttransenglish/2010/July/20100723164658su0.4912989.html; Secretary of State Hilary Clinton,
Clinton Statement on South China Sea (July 23, 2011), available at
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/07/20110723125330su0.906743
3.html#axzz1YkIMZEit; Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Remarks at International
Institute For Strategic Studies (Shangri-La—Asia Security) (June 5, 2010), available at
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1483 (Secretary Gates told an
international audience that, “[i]n Asia, we have placed a particular importance on
maritime commons for many years—for security, for trade and commerce, and free
passage. . . . Our policy is clear: It is essential that stability, freedom of navigation, and
free and unhindered economic development be maintained. We do not take sides on any
competing sovereignty claims, but we do oppose the use of force and actions that hinder
freedom of navigation.”).
126. Clinton, Hanoi Remarks, supra note 125 (Secretary Clinton stated, “[t]he United
States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to
Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.”).
127. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Refutes Fallacies on the South China Sea Issue,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (July 26, 2010),
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t719460.htm.
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the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and adjoining seas. In
response, a series of early U.S. Presidents requested, the U.S. Congress
authorized, and the U.S. Navy executed operations to protect the freedom
128
of navigation guaranteed to these U.S. vessels under international law.
During the final phases of World War I, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson
129
to the U.S. Congress,
made his famous “Fourteen Points” speech
during which he championed, as one of the universal principles for which
the United States and others were fighting, “[a]bsolute freedom of
navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in
war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international
action for the enforcement of international covenants.”130 Three months
before the United States entered World War II, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt delivered his “Freedoms of the Seas” radio address to the
American people, in which he declared,
Generation after generation, America has battled for the general
policy of the freedom of the seas. And that policy is a very
simple one, but a basic, a fundamental one. It means that no
nation has the right to make the broad oceans of the world at
great distances from the actual theatre of land war, unsafe for the
commerce of others.131
Ultimately, Roosevelt concluded, “Upon our naval and air patrol -- now
operating in large number over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean -falls the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the
seas.”132 All of these words and actions by the United States in defense
of the law of the sea occurred many years ago—long before the PRC was
established in 1949.
For the past three decades, the U.S. Government has executed a
multi-agency Freedom of Navigation (FON) program to uphold the law
of the sea against excessive maritime claims by coastal states—not just
128. Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 48, 1 Stat. 561 (An Act More Effectually to Protect the
Commerce and Coasts of the United States); Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578 (An
Act Further to Protect the Commerce of the United States); Act of February 6, 1802, ch.
4, 2 Stat. 129 (An Act for the Protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United
States Against the Tripolitan Cruisers); Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 90, 3 Stat. 230 (An Act
for the Protection of the Commerce of the United States against the Algerine Cruisers).
129. President Woodrow Wilson, Speech on the Fourteen Points (Jan. 8, 1918),
available at http://www.fordham.edu/halshall/mod/1918wilson.html.
130. Id.
131. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Freedom of the Seas Radio Address to American
People (Sept. 11, 1941).
132. Id.
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in the East Asia Sea, but throughout the world. Composed of informal
consultations, diplomatic protests, and operational assertions, the U.S.
FON program is focused on the excessive nature of some maritime
claims, rather than on the U.S. relationship with any particular coastal
133
In other words, the United States challenges excessive claims
state.
asserted by close U.S. allies, by competitors, and by potential
adversaries.134 For instance, in 1961—nearly two decades before the
U.S. Government formally established its FON program—the United
States diplomatically protested a maritime claim by treaty-ally Republic
of Philippines as excessive under the law of the sea.135 Thus, despite the
recent rhetoric of Chinese officials such as Foreign Minister Yang, China
has not been singled out by the long-standing U.S. FON program.
Additionally, the implication of China’s rhetoric that the United
States has a newfound concern over the law of the sea, and in the South
China Sea in particular, is also inconsistent with the reality of U.S.
history. To the contrary, the U.S. Government has repeatedly issued
statements and taken actions over the past three decades to uphold the
law of the sea in the South China Sea region. Throughout the 1980s,
1990s, and 2000s, the U.S. State Department has diplomatically
protested, and the U.S. Navy has operationally challenged, excessive
maritime claims asserted by South China Sea nations.136 In 1992, U.S.
Undersecretary of State Robert Zoellick publicly stated that the U.S.
Government’s position on the South China Sea remained unchanged,
including that it “wanted freedom of navigation to be preserved. . . .”137
In 1995, a U.S. State Department spokesman stated, “[m]aintaining
freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the United States.
Unhindered navigation by all ships and aircraft in the South China Sea is
essential for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific region,
including the United States.”138 All of these statements and actions
133. See ROACH & SMITH, supra note 67, at 4, 6.
134. Id. For example, the excessive maritime claims challenged diplomatically and
operationally by the U.S. FON Program have included claims by treaty allies, such as
Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of the Philippines, and Thailand. See
MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 35, 327, 349, 463.
135. MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 463; see also ROACH &
SMITH, supra note 67, at 134-38 (providing the text of the 1961 and 1986 U.S. diplomatic
protests of the Philippines’ excessive maritime claims).
136. MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 80, 280, 373, 463, 548,
689 (regarding the Phillipines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam).
137. Ang Cheng Guan, The South China Sea Dispute Re-visited 14-15 (INST. OF DEF. &
STRATEGIC STUDIES, Working Paper No. 4, 1999).
138. Christine Shelly, Briefer, U.S. Dep’t of State, Daily Press Briefing (May 10,
1995).
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occurred long before July 2010. Thus, it is clear that the United States
did not first start caring about the law of the sea, including in the South
China Sea, on the day that Secretary Clinton made her remarks two
summers ago in Hanoi.
C. China Behaves Like It Wants to Hinder
Freedom and Safety of Navigation
PRC Foreign Minister Yang has factually disputed concerns that the
law of the sea might be at risk in the South China Sea. In response to
Secretary Clinton’s remarks in July 2010, Foreign Minister Yang
rhetorically asked, “has navigation freedom and safety been hindered in
the South China Sea?”139 To which he quickly answered, “[o]bviously
140
As the official newspaper China Daily summarized Foreign
not.”
Minister Yang’s point, “[t]he South China Sea is currently a peaceful
area with navigational freedom.”141 Given the litany of state actions in
the South China Sea, however, these statements by the PRC are woefully
inaccurate.
In reality, a majority of the coastal states bordering the South China
Sea have taken actions evidencing an intent to hinder other nations’
lawful rights, freedoms, and uses of the South China Sea. Of the five
nations bordering the South China Sea, Vietnam,142 Malaysia,143 the
144
and China145 assert maritime claims that are excessive
Philippines,
under the law of the sea. China, however, is the only one that has a “full
house” of excessive claims. That is, China has established one or more
excessive claims for every maritime zone potentially available to a
coastal state: it has improperly drawn straight baselines with excessive
internal waters, restricted innocent passage in its territorial seas, asserted
a security interest in its contiguous zone, and restricted non-economic
activities in its exclusive economic zone.146 In fact, China is one of only
seven nations in the entire world that has infamously adopted a “full
139. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Refutes Fallacies on the South China Sea Issue,
supra note 127.
140. Id.
141. Li Xiaokun and Zhang Ting, Foreign Minister Warns of South China Sea Issue,
DAILY,
July
26,
2010,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010CHINA
07/26/content_11046544.htm.
142. MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 689-92.
143. Id. at 373-77.
144. Id. at 463-72.
145. Id. at 126-33.
146. Id.
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147
Therefore, the PRC Foreign
house” of excessive maritime claims.
Minister’s rhetoric that freedom of navigation is “obviously not
hindered” in the South China Sea does not match the reality that his
nation maintains one of the most comprehensive regimes of excessive
maritime claims of any coastal state in the entire world.
Through the years, the United States has diplomatically protested
and operationally challenged all of these excessive maritime claims by
South China Sea coastal states, including China. Unfortunately, none of
these coastal states have rescinded their excessive maritime claims, so
the United States has no choice but to continue exercising its permissible
rights, freedoms, and uses of the seas in order to preserve them under
international law. Thus, one of the primary reasons why China can even
begin to rhetorically assert that freedom of navigation is “obviously not
hindered” in the South China Sea area is precisely because the U.S.
military forces have routinely operated in those waters and helped
preserve those lawful rights, freedoms, and uses of the seas in that region
for over one hundred fifty years.148
In addition to enacting its comprehensive regime of excessive
maritime claims, China attempts to hinder freedom of navigation by
hindering safety of navigation. Like most of the nations of the world,
China is a party to the Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).149 COLREGS obligate
member-nations to ensure their government and flagged vessels alike
operate safely at sea through adherence to a detailed regime of specific
safety rules.150 Nevertheless, in March of 2009, five PRC-flagged
vessels unsafely surrounded USNS Impeccable in the South China Sea to
the point that they would likely have caused a collision and endangered
the lives of nationals from both nations, but for the heroic emergency all151
In doing so, at
stop maneuver of the Impeccable’s master and crew.

147. Only six other nations in the world have a “full house” of excessive maritime
claims: Bangladesh, Burma, India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. See id. at passim.
148. Robert M. Gates, Sec. of Def., Remarks by Secretary Gates at Vietnam National
University (Oct. 11, 2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4697.
149. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
(COLREGS), Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16, as amended by
Amendments to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Nov. 19,
1981, 35 U.S.T. 575, 1323 U.N.T.S. 353.
150. It is worth noting that, unlike some international treaties and conventions (e.g.,
UNCLOS), there is no exception or exemption in the COLREGS for sovereign immune
vessels. Id.
151. Odom, supra note 80, at 427.

230

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:2
152

least some of those five PRC vessels clearly violated the COLREGS.
Similarly, in the summer of 2011, another PRC-flagged fishing vessel
clearly violated the COLREGS in the South China Sea when it cut the
underwater equipment of a Vietnamese commercial survey vessel.153
Given those COLREGS violations, rhetoric by PRC officials stating that
“navigation safety” is not “hindered” in the South China Sea is
inconsistent with the reports of repeated occurrences of unsafe conduct
by PRC vessels, in addition to the corresponding inaction by the PRC
Government to hold those PRC-flagged vessels to account.
D. China Expects Others to Do as China Says, but not as China Does
For the past decade, China has made rhetorical statements
characterizing activities conducted by foreign militaries beyond China’s
territorial seas, including activities in and over China’s exclusive
economic zone, as violations of the international law of the sea. In April
2001, after the collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 plane and a PLA
Navy F-8 fighter jet over China’s exclusive economic zone, a PRC
spokesman stated that the EP-3’s military activities “violated” the law of
the sea.154 In a 2005 article, the PLA Navy’s leading maritime lawyer
argued that foreign military activities in a coastal state’s exclusive
economic zone violated various rules and principles of the law of the
sea.155 In March 2009, after five Chinese vessels harassed USNS
Impeccable approximately seventy miles off the coast of China, a PRC
spokesman stated, “[e]ngaging in activities in China’s exclusive
economic zone in the South China Sea without China’s permission, US
navy [sic] surveillance ship Impeccable broke relevant international law
as well as Chinese laws and regulations.”156 Read together, these
statements indicate that China asserts that foreign military activities in
and over a coastal state’s exclusive economic zone violates the
international law of the sea.

152. Id.
153. Vietnam Says Chinese Boat Harassed Survey Ship; China Disputes, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, June 9, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-06-09/vietnamsays-chinese-boat-harassed-survey-ship-china-disputes.html; Vietnam Says China
Fishing Boat Rams Research Ship, China Disputes, STRAITS TIMES, June 9, 2011,
http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/SEAsia/Story/STIStory_678024.html.
154. Chinese FM Spokesman Gives Full Account of Air Collision, XINHUA NEWS
SERV., Apr. 4, 2001, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/20010404/393124A.htm.
155. See generally Ren & Cheng, supra note 107, at 139.
156. Ma, supra note 84.
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During that same period of time, however, China has conducted
military activities in the exclusive economic zones of other nations.
157
and some of China’s neighbors,158 have
Maritime legal scholars,
catalogued through open sources a series of PRC state actions in recent
years where China’s military forces have repeatedly operated in waters
off the coast of third-party nations like Japan and the Philippines. These
waters are the equivalent of those off the Chinese coast where the PRC
has attempted to restrict the military activities of the United States and
other nations. While the United States has demonstrated a consistent
position of word and deed on these law of the sea issues, 159 the rhetoric
157. See generally Peter Dutton, Scouting, Signaling, and Gatekeeping: Chinese Naval
Operations in Japanese Waters and the International Law Implications, CHINA MARITIME
STUDIES INSTITUTE (Feb. 2009); Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights, supra note 67,
at 16-17.
158. See, e.g., Defense of Japan 2010, MINISTRY OF DEF. 61-62,
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2010/11Part1_Chapter2_Sec3.pdf (“China has
been intensifying its maritime activities in recent years. With regard to activity in waters
near Japan, Chinese naval vessels have been observed conducting what appeared to be
exercises or information gathering activities. Chinese government ships have also been
observed engaging in apparent oceanographic research within the exclusive economic
zone of Japan. . . . [I]n April 2010, 10 naval vessels, including Kilo-class submarines and
Sovremenny-class destroyers, passed the channel between Okinawa Island and Miyako
Island and headed to the waters west of Okinotori Island, before engaging in apparent
exercises. At the time, Chinese shipborned helicopters flew near the Japanese destroyers
monitoring the vessels a couple of times. In addition, a submerged Chinese nuclearpowered submarine navigated in Japanese territorial waters in November 2004, breaching
international law. In September 2005, it was confirmed that a total of five Chinese naval
vessels, including one Soveremenny-class destroyer, were sailing near the Kashi gas field
(Tianwaitian in Chinese) in the East China Sea and some of them circled around the said
gas field. In October 2006, a Chinese Song-class submarine surfaced in the vicinity of
the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in international waters reportedly near Okinawa.”).
159. Consider two recent examples involving Russian military forces operating near the
United States. In the summer of 2009, there were reports in the Washington Post that
Russian submarines were operating off the coast of the United States. Philip P. Pan, Russian
General Calls Submarine Patrols Near U.S. East Coast Routine, Wash. Post, Aug. 6, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/08/04/AR2009080402863.html. In response to these Russian
submarine operations, a U.S. Department of Defense spokesman said, “Did we have an
indication that they were coming this way? Sure. . . . The larger question is, is it of concern
to us. And the answer to that is -- no.” Id. More recently, in the summer of 2010, the
Washington Times reported that Russian bombers were conducting air operations over U.S.
airspace.
Bill Gertz, Inside the Ring, WASH. TIMES, July 7, 2010,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/7/inside-the-ring-404830028/. In response
to those Russian bomber operations, the head of U.S. Northern Command told the media,
“we intercept them when we feel like we ought to, and we have various criteria that we use
for that, to include just rehearsing our own skills to be able to do that. [However, in general]
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of China—that foreign militaries lack the legal right to operate within
China’s exclusive economic zone—is undermined by similar Chinese
military activities in the exclusive economic zones of other nations.
Apparently, China expects the world to do as China says, and not as
China does.
E. It’s a Matter of Transparency and Maturity
“Legal transparency” is a critical principle of the rule of law, both
domestically and internationally.160 In the international law context,
legal transparency means that the legal position of a nation on a
particular issue is identified and justified; thereafter, other nations in the
consent-based international legal order can consider that position and its
purported justification, scrutinize it, and choose to consent or object to
that position.161
Transparency is also related to maturity.
In
international relations, diplomatic or political dialogues between nations
have been characterized as mature and immature, with mature political
dialogues being those in which the parties move beyond rehashed talking

we just leave them alone.” Id. In both situations, there is no evidence to indicate that the
United States diplomatically objected to these lawful military activities, or that U.S. forces
reacted unsafely or unprofessionally. This demonstrates an alternative reality: that of a nation
that honestly believes in its legal position on matters involving the law of the sea, and does
not challenge the right of other nations to exercise those same navigational freedoms in its
maritime zones.
160. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616
(Aug.
23,
2004),
available
at
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/
Get?Open&DS=S/2004/616&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC (“The rule of law is a concept at
the very heart of the Organization’s mission. It refers to a principle of governance in
which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself,
are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights
norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles
of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the
application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal
certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.”) (emphasis
added).
161. Because international law is a consent-based regime, nations cannot provide
informed consent to the official actions of other nations if those actions and the legal
justification for those actions are not transparent. In fact, that sequential process is what
underlies the long-accepted concept of customary international law known as the
“persistent objector.” IAN BROWNLEE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 11
(6th ed. 2003).
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162
Similarly, in the international law context, legal dialogues
points.
between nations can also be characterized as mature and immature:
mature legal dialogues are those in which all parties clearly identify their
respective legal positions, justify those legal positions based upon sound
legal methodology (e.g., ordinary meaning, context, negotiating history
of conventions, and respect for custom), concede points of convergence,
recognize points of divergence, and attempt to refute those points of
divergence through sound legal methodology.163 Ultimately, only
through mutual legal transparency can nations attain mature legal
dialogues in their relations with other nations. In other words, if one
nation is transparent in its legal positions and justifications, but another
nation chooses not to be equally transparent and instead continues to rely
upon superficial rhetoric, then a mature legal dialogue between those
nations becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible.
In recent years, nations such as the United States,164 Australia,165
Japan,166 and Vietnam167 have expressed concern over China’s lack of

162. See, e.g., Kathrin Hille, US Warns Over Beijing’s “Assertiveness,” FIN. TIMES,
May
25,
2010,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0a97c53a-681a-11df-a52f00144feab49a.html#axzz1jVctPVgG (quoting Admiral Robert Willard as saying, “What
was very striking yesterday was my impression of the very advanced, sophisticated and
mature dialogue that’s occurring across a wide range of subjects [at the Strategic and
Economic Dialogue] between China and the US. . . . That is in contrast with a very
immature military-to-military relationship.”) (emphasis added); see also Yoichi Kato,
U.S. Commander Says China Aims to Be a “Global Military” Power, ASAHI SHIMBUN,
Dec.
28,
2010,
http://luckybogey.wordpress.com/category/travel/page/category/
aviation/page/3 (quoting Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
as saying, “There is an effort on the part of the United States to engage China. I think
there is an effort on the part of China to engage the United States. And I think that it’s
very broad. At the Strategic and Economic Dialogue that I attended with Secretary
Clinton, I was struck by the very rich and mature engagement across many of our
secretariats and many of China’s ministries and the depth of commitment that they both
had to their dialogue. On the military side, we’re relatively immature and behind in our
relationship, and I think it affects the perception of that strategic relationship between the
two nations.”) (emphasis added).
163. To illustrate the difference between mature and immature legal perspectives,
consider an analogy to statutory interpretation. To a non-lawyer, a rule means what it
says on its face, and nothing more. This is an immature perspective. In contrast, a
seasoned lawyer can extract a deeper understanding of the meanings from that same
statute, from its text, its context, its legislative history, and related case law. This is a
mature perspective.
164. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 116, at I
(stating that many uncertainties remain regarding how China will use its expanding
military capabilities, and that China’s limited transparency in its military and security
affairs enhances uncertainty and increases the potential for misunderstanding and
miscalculation.); see also China: Military And Security Developments: Hearing Before

234

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:2

“transparency” in matters involving international affairs. Similarly, on
law of the sea matters, China has also demonstrated a lack of
transparency. For example, after the Impeccable incident in March 2009,
a PRC spokesman made a declarative statement that the U.S. Navy’s
activities “broke international law,” but deliberately refused to provide
news reporters with a transparent explanation of how foreign military
activities in China’s exclusive economic zone violated international
168
Similarly, China unilaterally draws a nine-dash line on its South
law.
the H. Comm. on Armed Services 111th Cong. 59 (2010) (statement of Wallace C.
Gregson, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs),
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:58169.pdf (stating that the United
States “remain[s] concerned over the relative lack of transparency from China into the
military capabilities it is acquiring, the intentions that motivate those acquisitions, and the
resources dedicated to the task”); Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Inaugural
Richard C. Holbrooke Lecture: A Broad Vision of U.S.-China Relations in the 21st
Century (Jan. 14, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/01/
154653.htm (“The United States and the international community have watched China’s
efforts to modernize and expand its military, and we have sought clarity as to its
intentions. As Secretary Gates stressed in Beijing this week, both sides would benefit
from sustained and substantive military-to-military engagement that increases
transparency. We need more high-level visits, more joint exercises, more exchanges
from our professional military organizations, and other steps to build that trust,
understanding of intentions, and familiarity.”).
165. DEP’T OF DEF. (AUSTL.), DEFENDING AUSTRALIA IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC CENTURY:
FORCE 2030, 95 (2009), available at http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/
defence_white_paper_2009.pdf (emphasizing the need for greater military-to-military
engagement with China in order to “encourage transparency about Chinese military
capabilities and intentions.”).
166. MINISTRY OF DEF. (JAPAN), DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2010, 55 (2010), available at
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2010/11Part1_Chapter2_Sec3.pdf (“China has
not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible major power in the
international society.”).
167. Greg Terode, A Flash of Steel and Velvet Glove From Vietnam, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, July 29, 2010, http://viet-studies.info/kinhte/NguyenChiVinh%20_steel_
and_velvet.htm (Quoting Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh, Deputy Defence
Minister of Vietnam as saying, “No confidence-building measure [by the Chinese
military] could be better than transparency.”).
168. Ma, supra note 84 (“Engaging in activities in China’s exclusive economic zone in
the South China Sea without China’s permission, US navy surveillance ship Impeccable
broke relevant international law as well as Chinese laws and regulations.”). The reporters
present at the March 10th press conference immediately realized that this official
statement by Mr. Ma was purely conclusory in nature. Id. Thus, a follow-up question
was asked by a reporter that requested specificity:
[Reporter]: Can you clearly explain which article of the international law that the
US ship broke and which specific act of the US ship broke the international law?
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169
China Sea maps and declares “indisputable sovereignty” in the area,
but refuses to officially clarify to other nations what those nine dashes
specifically mean or how international law justifies them. Consequently,
nations such as the United States,170 Indonesia,171 and Singapore172 have
called upon China to be transparent and clarify its claim in the South
China Sea.

[Mr. Ma]: It seems that you are very interested in this issue. I think China’s
position is already very clear, and I responded to the US stories. I can also tell you
that China handles such issues in accordance with relevant laws and regulations. I
have nothing more to add.
Id. Mr. Ma’s non-discussion of the law avoided specificity at the outset, and when
questioned thereafter, he referred back to the previous statements of non-specificity. Id.
The reporters present were still not satisfied with this superficial response on the law, as
indicated by a second follow-up question, again requesting specificity:
[Reporter]: I want to go back to the question of the US surveillance ship. You did
mention a number of laws. Could you clarify what specific parts of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea and Chinese laws of the sea are concerned so
that we can refer to it and see on paper to know what you are talking about?

：

[Mr. Ma] While answering the questions, I mentioned three laws: UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Law of the People’s Republic of China on the
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, and Regulations of the
People’s Republic of China on the Management of Foreign-related Marine
Scientific Research. I suggest you go back to do some homework, reading these
laws carefully, and you will thereby find the answer you want.
Id. Here again, Mr. Ma implied that the rules of law in UNCLOS are so clear on their
face that the reporters should be able to see that China is correct, merely by reading the
Convention’s text. Through all of these statements, however, China never specified
which provision of international law restricted the Impeccable’s right to operate in these
waters beyond China’s territorial seas. Id. Moreover, China failed to specify which rule
of international law gave it the authority to require the Impeccable to seek and receive
China’s permission prior to conducting operations beyond its territorial seas. Id.
169. Letter from Permanent Mission to the United Nations (Indon.) to Ban Ki-moon,
Secretary
General,
United
Nations
(July
8,
2010),
available
at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e.pdf [hereinafter Letter from
Permanent Mission].
170. See Maritime Disputes and Sovereignty Issues in East Asia: Hearing Before the
S. Subcomm. on E. Asian and Pac. Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Scot
Marciel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs), available
at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/MarcielTestimony090715p1.pdf.
171. See Letter from Permanent Mission, supra note 169.
172. Comments in Responses to Media Queries, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SINGAPORE
(June
20,
2011),
http://app.mfa.gov.sg/2006/press/
view_press.asp?post_id=7070.
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Unfortunately, China has not explained its lack of transparency on
these law of the sea matters. China might still be learning how to fit into
the existing international legal order after opting out of it for many
173
Alternatively or additionally, China might be afraid of
years.
174
revealing or conceding the weakness of its legal positions. Regardless
of China’s reasons, it is impossible for nations to engage China in mature
legal dialogue when it refuses to reciprocate the transparency of legal
positions and justifications provided by nations like the United States on
law of the sea matters.175 Yet transparency and mature dialogue by all
173. In the fall of 2010, the late Professor Jon Van Dyke of the University of Hawaii’s
William S. Richardson School of Law hosted a South China Sea workshop that included
a group of Chinese legal scholars and which this author attended. During an informal
lunch at the workshop, the author asked one of the Chinese scholars—who was a
“visiting scholar” from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs—why Chinese scholars
repeatedly state that the nine-dash line could have one of several meanings, but China’s
Government continues to refrain from stating the true meaning of the line. After a little
back and forth discussion, he finally asked, “What do you think would be a reasonable
meaning of the line?” The author’s response: “That’s not how international law works.
Rather, your government has to explain the line, justify it under the established
international law regime, and then other nations in the world will consider that
explanation and justification, and take a position on it.” In reality, that is the way the
international legal order has functioned for many years, and that is the way the world
should insist it continue to function—in the interest of stability and transparency in
international rule of law.
174. The question should be asked: Why does China’s Government refuse to be more
transparent on stating the meaning of and providing legal justification for state actions,
such as drawing its nine-dashed line in the South China Sea? To answer this question,
we should consider a common refrain of China’s reluctance to be more transparent about
its military in general as a possible mindset for their reticence to be more transparent in
international law matters. See, e.g., Lu Yin, Relativity of Military Transparency, CHINA
DAILY (P.R.C.), Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/200910/29/content_8865633.htm (“[T]ransparency has also become an instrument of the
strong to exert pressure on the weak. Obviously, transparency is in favor of the strong, as
deterrence. For the weak, transparency means revealing weaknesses and becoming more
vulnerable.”) In the context of legal transparency, perhaps China is concerned that if it
tries to provide a detailed explanation and justification for such tenuous legal positions
like its purported restriction of its exclusive economic zone or its nine-dash line claim,
such transparency will “reveal weakness” and its rhetorical house of cards will quickly
collapse.
175. The United States supports transparency about matters involving international
law, including the law of the sea. See, e.g., Clinton, UNCLOS Transmittal, supra note
67; MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 73; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE,
ANNUAL REPORTS OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONAL ASSERTIONS: FISCAL YEARS
2000-2010, available at http://policy.defense.gov/gsa/cwmd/fon.aspx; U.S. DEP’T. OF
NAVY ET AL., NWP 1-14 M, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS (2007), available at http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-
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nations is essential to the functioning of the existing international legal
order. Therefore, the world should insist that China demonstrate genuine
support for the established international legal order, by improving its
transparency and openness on law of the sea matters.
F. It’s Also a Matter of Trust
Candor is also a fundamental prerequisite of any mature legal
dialogue. For example, consider what the ethical rules and codes of
professional conduct require from practicing attorneys. Lawyers shall
never make false or incorrect statements of fact or law to a judge or
tribunal.176 Lawyers shall never make false or incorrect statements of
fact or law to a third party.177 They shall never induce or assist their
4779-9925-0defea93325c/1-14M_(Jul_2007)_(NWP.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF
NAVY ET AL., COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK].
176. For the rule of professional conduct of U.S. attorneys that requires candor to a
tribunal, see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_3_3.html (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make
a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material
fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”). For rules of professional
conduct for attorneys appearing before international tribunals, see, e.g., CODE OF PROF’L
CONDUCT FOR COUNSEL, INT’L CRIM. CT. art. 24(3), available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
BD397ECF-8CA8-44EF-92C6AB4BEBD55BE2/140121/ICCASP432Res1_English.pdf (“Counsel shall not deceive or
knowingly mislead the Court. He or she shall take all steps necessary to correct an
erroneous statement made by him or her or by assistants or staff as soon as possible after
becoming aware that the statement was erroneous.”); id. art. 25(1) (“Counsel shall at all
times maintain the integrity of evidence, whether in written, oral or any other form,
which is submitted to the Court. He or she shall not introduce evidence which he or she
knows to be incorrect.”). See also CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR COUNSEL APPEARING
BEFORE THE INT’L TRIBUNAL, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, art.
23(B),
available
at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/
Defence/defence_code_of_conduct_june2006.pdf; id. art. 23(2) (“Counsel shall not
knowingly: (i) make an incorrect statement of material fact or law to the Tribunal; or (ii)
offer evidence which counsel knows to be incorrect.”); id. art. 23(D) (“Counsel shall take
all necessary steps to correct an incorrect statement of material fact or law by counsel in
proceedings before the Tribunal as soon as possible after counsel becomes aware that the
statement was incorrect.”). Interestingly, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
has not adopted a code or rules of professional conduct for attorneys appearing before the
Tribunal. See Laurel S. Terry, Codes of Conduct for International Tribunals and
Arbitration (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/s/lst3/
presentations%20for%20webpage/ASIL_Terry_Codes_International_Tribunals.pdf.
RULES
OF
PROF’L
CONDUCT
R.
4.1,
available
at
177. MODEL
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules
_of_professional_conduct/rule_4_1_truthfulness_in_statements_to_others (“In the course
of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of
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178
They shall never falsify
client or witnesses to make false statements.
179
More generally, they shall not “engage in conduct
evidence.
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”180 Therefore,
as critical as transparency might be in fostering a mature legal dialogue,
honesty and truthfulness on matters of fact and law are equally
important181 to ensure that a legal dialogue is mature. Candor, honesty
and truthfulness by the attorneys and other representatives of parties will
foster trust between the parties; likewise, deception and misleading
statements of fact and law by representatives can perpetuate mistrust
between nations.
In recent years, the United States182 and China’s neighbors183 have
expressed concerns about trusting China on matters of international
affairs as well as law of the sea matters. While some in China allege that
the United States and other nations attempt to plant “seeds of distrust,”184

material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third
person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a
client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.”).
178. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (“A lawyer shall not . . . falsify
evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness
that is prohibited by law.”).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”).
181. At the outset of their legal education, practicing lawyers learn that deceiving the
judge about the facts or the law of the case at hand is a cardinal sin—it destroys your
credibility before the tribunal and will not be easily forgotten. See JAMES W.
MCELHANEY, MCELHANEY’S LITIGATION 12 (1995) (“Nothing devastates your credibility
more than looking like you deliberately created a false impression.”).
182. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MILITARY
AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA I (2010),
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/070523-china-military-power-final.pdf
(“Sustained
and reliable U.S.-China military-to-military relations support this goal by reducing
mistrust, enhancing mutual understanding and broadening cooperation.”) (emphasis
added).
183. Asia’s Mistrust of China: Fear of Beijing is Based On Its Past Behavior and
Strategic Culture, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424053111903461104576459660040607374.html.
184. These “seeds of distrust” appear to be a common refrain when Beijing wishes to
cast blame on the United States for any problems of trust arising in international relations
with China. See, e.g., Strategic Trust Needed, CHINA DAILY , Jan. 11, 2011,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-01/11/content_11823273.htm (“The US
arms sales to Taiwan, which have been ongoing for more than 30 years, are the biggest
impediment, but intensive reconnaissance and surveillance of the Chinese mainland from
the South China Sea and East China Sea and Washington’s growing penchant for
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the reality is that China’s own actions provide “fertile ground” for other
185
The rhetoric employed by the PRC
nations to mistrust China.
Government in ongoing law of the sea disputes provides ample cause for
mistrust; it has been deficient on both statements of fact and statements
of law.
Some of the PRC’s statements of material facts pertaining to
incidents involving the law of the seas have been inaccurate.
For
example, after the Impeccable incident of March 2009, a PRC
spokesmen characterized the U.S. factual account of the incident as
“flatly inaccurate,” “gravely in contravention of the facts,” “groundless
accusations,” and ultimately “sheer lies.”186
These rhetorical
characterizations, however, were soon refuted by a series of
photographs187 and video clips188 taken during the incident that
corroborated the U.S. account. Similarly, after the December 2010
projecting its military power in the Asia Pacific have also sowed the seeds of distrust
between the two militaries.”).
185. They Have Returned: China Should Worry Less About America’s “Containment”
Strategy and More About Why the Neighbours Welcome It, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 12,
2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16791842.
186. Ma, supra note 84; China Lodges Representation as U.S. Naval Ship Breaks Int’l,
GENERAL
NEWS
SERV.,
Mar.
11,
2009,
Chinese
Laws,
XINHUA
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/11/content_10990180.htm; Defense Ministry
Urges U.S. to Respect China’s Security Concern, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 11, 2009,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/11/content_10994295.htm; Regular Press
Release, Spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang (Mar. 25, 2009), available
at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t553628.htm.
187. Chinese Vessels Shadow, Harass Unarmed U.S. Surveillance Ship, NAVY.MIL,
(Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.navy.mil/ view_single.asp?id=69478 (photo depicting the
Chinese vessels accompanying article).
188. Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW, YOUTUBE (Mar.
8, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G59796asqIs (last visited Mar. 26, 2010);
Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 2, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F8nZjDrj4qY (last visited Mar. 26, 2010);
Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 3, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dn4mPttljEY (last visited Mar. 26, 2010);
Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 4, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aBBwr6EQAYc (last visited Mar. 26, 2010);
Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 5, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9SyTz4q2r5k; Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships
Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 6, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6e55hrHZLm8 (last visited Apr. 18, 2012);
Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 7, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ye-BEI5_QC8 (last visited Apr. 18,2012);
Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 8, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7D-Kfza58s (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).
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collision between a PRC-flagged fishing vessel and a ROK Coast Guard
vessel, a PRC spokesman called upon the ROK to “punish [ROK Coast
Guard] perpetrators to the full extent of law,” “make compensation for
189
and “take concrete measures to
the loss of our crew and property,”
190
Here again, this PRC
prevent reoccurrences of such incidents.”
rhetoric regarding the ROK’s alleged culpability was refuted when the
Chinese fishermen confessed191 to intentionally colliding with the ROK
Coast Guard vessel and the ROK released video evidence of the incident
that “showed a brawl in which iron pipes were used as weapons by
fishermen.”192 In both situations, the rhetoric employed by China after
these incidents was subsequently undermined by evidence of what really
happened.
Additionally, China has also made misleading statements of law on
these matters. In legal arguments, lawyers must disclose legal authorities
that are “directly adverse” to their client’s case.193 On matters of
international law like the law of the sea, this includes not using the words
194
Contrary
and phrases within treaties and conventions out of context.
to that expectation, China’s standard approach to the law is to
“assembl[e] . . . legal clauses to frame . . . political arguments and . . .

189. China Demands Compensation over Collision in Yellow Sea, KYODO NEWS
INTERNAT’L, Dec. 27, 2010, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9K87Q380&
show_article=1.
190. Regular Press Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affars Spokesman (Dec. 22,
2010), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t780909.htm.
191. S. Korea Releases 3 Chinese Fishermen Without Indictment, KYODO NEWS INT’L,
Dec. 27, 2010, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9KAMQE81&show_article=1
(“During questioning by the South Korean Coast Guard, the three Chinese fisherman
admitted that their ship intentionally collided with the patrol boat to prevent it from
tracking another Chinese fishing vessel.”).
192. S. Korea Releases Chinese Fishermen, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Dec. 25, 2010, http://www.upi.
com/Top_News/World-News/2010/12/25/S-Korea-releases-Chinese-fishermen/UPI-57581293286
587/.
193. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 4 (2010) noting that:
A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must
recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore…an advocate
has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that
has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal
argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly
applicable to the case.
194. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, at art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”) (emphasis added).
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195
For example, China argues to the world
propaganda campaign[s].”
that foreign military activities in its exclusive economic zone violate
UNCLOS because they are not, in China’s view, a “peaceful use” of the
ocean or intended for a “peaceful purpose.”196 This stance, however,
takes these two phrases out of their appropriate context within
197
as those phrases also apply to the high seas, and the
UNCLOS,
negotiators of UNCLOS clearly had no intent of demilitarizing the
198
Additionally, China has argued that foreign
oceans of the world.
military activities in its exclusive economic zone are illegal because they
threaten the coastal state’s environment.199 This position, however,

195. See, e.g., JAMES MCGREGOR, ONE BILLION CUSTOMERS: LESSONS FROM THE FRONT
LINES OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 150-151 (2005) (McGregor recounts his negotiations
with China’s official news service Xinhua and the Chinese Government for access to
reporting financial news in China. McGregor identified a classic Chinese bargaining
technique:
We also used the law as a political weapon, just as the Communist Party does. We
searched through international and domestic statutes and trade pacts to find
language we could turn into noble weapons that put us on the side of the angels . . .
. [W]e weren’t building a legal case. We didn’t have a clear one. Instead, we used
this assemblage of legal clauses to frame our political arguments and our
propaganda campaign.
196. See Ren & Cheng, supra note 107, at 142-144.
197. UNCLOS, supra note 25, at arts. 88, 301. The reference to “peaceful uses” in
Article 301, however, is not within the text of the article, but rather the title of the article
itself.
198. Bernard Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 831-832 (1984)
If there is anything that is clear from the legislative record of the Conference on
the Law of the Sea, it is that one of the primary motivations of the major maritime
powers in negotiating a new Convention was to protect the broadest possible
freedom to conduct military activities at sea. It is unlikely that they would have
agreed to legal restraints on those very activities without significant negotiation
and detail.
See also George V. Galdorisi & Alan G. Kauffman, Military Activities in the Exclusive
Economic Zone: Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict, 32 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
253, 294 n.238.
[T]he Chinese analysis is “based on a flawed understanding of the meaning of
article 301 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea by which the
writer inflates the meaning of article 58 to include security concerns. . . . Taken to
its logical conclusion, the argument would exclude the operation of warships and
military aircraft everywhere, even on the high seas.”
Id. (quoting Ivan Shearer, Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: The Case
of Aerial Surveillance, 17 OCEAN Y.B. 548, 560-61 (2003))
199. See Ren & Cheng, supra note 107, at 140; see also Zuoping, supra note 87, at 2
noting that UNCLOS
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ignores the “directly adverse” provision of UNCLOS that expressly
exempts sovereign immune vessels, including warships, from
compliance with coastal states’ environmental regulations that govern
200
their exclusive economic zones.
V. RHETORIC AS A CAUSE FOR CONCERN
Rhetoric is “the art of speaking or writing effectively.”201
Effectiveness is not synonymous with accuracy or truthfulness. Rather,
words or actions are effective if they produce a desired or intended
effect. Therefore, in assessing whether China’s use of rhetoric is
effective, we must consider the desired or intended effect of its rhetoric.
At its core, the purpose of China’s rhetoric on law of the sea matters is
the same as that behind China’s employment of “legal warfare” in the
law of the sea—using domestic and international law to restrain the
activities of other nations by shrinking their political and physical
space.202
Should China’s use of such rhetoric worry other nations? Perhaps it
is true that a nation’s use of words has no tangible effect and that only
actions pose a risk to international security and stability, but should the
world dismiss China’s rhetoric on law of the sea matters as “just words”
that pose no risk to the community of nations?
By its nature, laws—be they domestic or international, conventional
or customary—are composed of words. Anyone who assumes that rules
of law are “just words” need only consider the actions that domestic
statutes and international conventions authorize or limit, as well as the
consequences for violating laws such as criminal statutes. Likewise,
statements of law and interpretations of law must be accurate and
grounded in accepted legal methodology. For example, conventions

indeed stipulates that countries have navigation rights in other countries’ EEZs.
But the convention also states that a coastal country has sole ownership of the
biological and non-biological resources inside its EEZs, as well as sovereign rights
of exploitation, exploration, maintenance and management. A coastal country can
also enact its own laws to prevent, control and reduce pollution. These navigation
rights refer to ‘innocent passage,’ on which point the U.S. Navy obviously cannot
stand. Therefore, it is necessary and perfectly justifiable for China to dispel U.S.
Navy surveillance ships from its EEZs to protect its marine environment and
resources.
200. UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 236. See also Oxman, supra note 198, at 820.
201. Rhetoric Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/rhetoric (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).
202. See supra Part III.A.
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such as UNCLOS must be read with the aid of established rules of
interpretation, such as respecting the ordinary meaning, the context, and
the drafters’ intent of the words contained in those rules of law.
Additionally, the rules of customary law should be respected as much as
those of conventional law, even if a particular nation did not participate
during the period when the law developed. If a particular nation
manipulates the rules of a convention or ignores the long-standing
customs and practices of nations, that is not simply a harmless matter of
203
“just words.” Instead, such “verbal acts” of official statements and
interpretations of international law are forms of state action that are
intended to have a negative effect on an international legal regime and
the existing international order.
When the realities of the law of the sea are compared to China’s
rhetoric, it appears that modern China behaves as if the world is stuck in
an international version of “Groundhog Day,”204 where nations are
unaware of yesterday or tomorrow in the international legal order and
where the actions of one nation (i.e., China) have no long-term
consequences. PRC rhetoric undervalues the significance of centuries of
state practice, disregards the history of treaty negotiations under
UNCLOS, and ignores the fact that China voluntarily acceded to the
treaty with few written declarations, none of which interpreted the
exclusive economic zone concept in the manner China seeks to now. It
is not realistic for China to operate as if the nations of the world live only
in the here and now, where the law stands still in deference to a rising
China.
On the contrary, the other nations of the world know that the existing
international legal order and system, including the law of the sea, does
not function in that way. In terms of conventional law, a convention that
was deliberately negotiated and concluded by more than one hundred
nations three decades ago still matter.
In terms of customary
international law, the practices of states over a period of decades—and
even centuries—still matter. Actions, as well as inactions, by nationstates have consequences. PRC’s deliberate decision to largely isolate
itself for the first several decades of its existence, while the body of
international law continued to develop, is now resulting in conflict
between the realities of current international law and PRC’s interests.
203. The concept of “verbal acts” is manifested in various subspecialties of law (e.g.,
contract law, rules of evidence), and focuses on how some verbal statements should be
construed as actions.
204. For a synopsis of the movie, see Plot Summary for Groundhog Day, IMDB.COM,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0107048/plotsummary (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
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Plain and simple, international law was not born when the PRC started to
care about it.
As discussed, China’s rhetoric does not fully match up with the
reality of international law. Moreover, there is not merely one
disconnect between over what the international law of the sea says versus
what China wishes it said. Rather, there are many disconnects. For this
reason, the only reasonable answer to the Mederios question whether
China accepts or seeks to rewrite the prevailing rules of the law of the
sea is: China does not accept the prevailing rules of the international law
of the sea, instead China seeks to rewrite them.
The effect of that conclusion should be concerning to the world.
China’s efforts jeopardize the entire UNCLOS regime, which took nearly
a decade to negotiate and has been ratified by 162 of the 192 nations of
the world.205 The legal regime reflected in UNCLOS was a grand
bargain between all of the states, the United States and China among
them, who had a seat at the bargaining table during those ten plus years
of peaceful and deliberate negotiations. Like any bargain, no nation at
the UNCLOS negotiations received everything it wanted. At the final
session in Montego Bay in December 1982, Ambassador Tommy Koh
from Singapore identified several common observations shared among
the negotiators that highlight the nature of the bargained deal. One
observation was that no individual nation was “fully satisfied” with the
UNCLOS bargain as it was structured to accommodate competing
interests.206 Another observation was that UNCLOS was a “package”
deal where nations were not allowed to selectively follow certain
207
In short, no compromise is perfect.
provisions and disregard others.
But, as pointed out by Ambassador Koh, these compromises are the
strengths, not weaknesses, of the Convention.208
Many of the points about the law of the sea that China seeks to raise
now were addressed at previous negotiating conferences where China
had an opportunity to press its views. However, the majority view
209
prevailed and China’s position on many of these issues was rejected.
Thus, if China is permitted to ignore the realities of the international law
205. For a list of the 162 nations that have acceded to UNCLOS, see U.N. Div. for
Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, supra note 87.
206. See generally Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh, President, Third U.N. Conference
on the Law of the Sea, A Constitution for the Oceans (Dec. 1982), available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/ convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf.
207. Id.
208. Id. at xxxvii.
209. See, e.g., Oxman supra note 198, at 831-832 (discussing the freedom of military
navigation).
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of the sea—including the ordinary meaning, context, and intent of these
UNCLOS’s rules—then nothing prevents other nations from emulating
China’s rhetorical approach of selective compliance in the name of
210
potentially undermining
imperfections, drawbacks, or shortcomings,
almost ten years of extensive multilateral negotiations and possibly
jeopardizing the UNCLOS regime.
Such noble-sounding rhetoric
ignores the reality that no treaty or convention can ever be perfected.
The only way a treaty can be perfected is when one nation receives
everything it wants and then it is only perfect for that nation–which
sounds a lot like the “unequal treaties” of the nineteenth century which
the China has scorned for nearly a century.
VI. WAYS CHINA CAN REASSURE THE WORLD
Actions and inaction by nation-states do have consequences.
Accordingly, the reader might ask: What specifically could China do, or
abstain from doing, to yield a positive result in its relations with other
nations in regard to the law of the sea? Several suggestions follow.
First, China’s Government could make better efforts to publish its
official legal interpretations and manuals on international law, including
those focused on the law of the sea. By comparison, the U.S.
Government has been transparent for decades in its interpretation of
various matters of international law, including the law of the sea.211 The
U.S. Government has effectuated such transparency by publishing its
legal positions and explanations and widely disseminating those
materials on the internet for the world to see.212 For example, documents
such as the 1994 Transmittal Package that President Clinton submitted to
the U.S. Senate regarding the ratification of UNCLOS included a fortyseven-page, section-by-section “Commentary” of analysis and
interpretation of the convention.213 The Chinese Government, however,
210. UNCLOS is not the first law of the sea convention that China has criticized as
flawed. See GREENFIELD, supra note 78, at 55 (“In a statement calling for a new and
comprehensive convention to meet current needs, Chinese delegate Shen Wei-Liang said
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone that it contained many
unjustifiable provisions, which only served to preserve certain interests.”).
211. See generally Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, Transperency: Analysis of an Evolving
Fundemental Principal of International Economic Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 579, 594
(2006).
212. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Major State Dep’t Publications, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/221.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2012)
(providing a directory of State Department papers).
213. See Clinton, UNCLOS Transmittal, supra note 67.
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has not released any similar materials pertaining to its deliberations on
and accession to UNCLOS in 1996. If such documents exist, China
214
should consider releasing these legal analyses to the public.
The United States has also disseminated publications providing the
U.S. perspective on a wide range of international law issues, such as the
U.S. Navy’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, a
recurring twelve-chapter publication that includes four chapters focused
on the law of the sea.215
The U.S. Navy has also published an
Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook that provides
specific citations to the legal and policy authorities from which its
assertions or interpretations are derived.216 Additionally, the U.S. Navy
has made strides toward increasing the worldwide accessibility of the
Commander’s Handbook—a Spanish translation of the handbook is
currently available217 and there are plans to translate it further into other
languages.218 Admittedly, the PLA should be commended for publishing
some manuals like Basics of International Law for Modern Soldiers.219
But more is needed—similarly detailed annotations and translations of
PLA manuals like Basics of International Law for Modern Soldiers
would aid outsiders in better understanding China’s legal positions.
Second, China’s Government could join the peaceful and
professional efforts of the United States to challenge the excessive
maritime claims of other nations; it is in China’s long-term interest to
help preserve the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea around the world.
As previously discussed in Part III.B of this Comment, the United States
routinely issues diplomatic protests and conducts operational assertions
against improperly drawn straight baselines, restrictions on the
navigational right of innocent passage, unpermitted security restrictions
on contiguous zones, and non-economic restrictions on exclusive
economic zones. As China’s PLA Navy continues to operate more
214. As the Author is unable to read Mandarin Chinese this criticism may be
unfounded or inaccurate. If any reader is aware of resources on law of the sea matters
that have been published by China’s government, it is respectfully requested that the
reader inform this Author at the email address provided at the outset of the article.
215. U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY ET AL., COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 175.
216. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS (A. R. Thomas & James C. Duncan, eds. 1999), available at
http://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/International-Law/RightsideLinks/StudiesSeries/documents/Navel-War-College-vol-73.aspx.
217. LEY DE OPERACIONES NAVALES MANUAL DEL COMANDANTE (2007), available at
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/f267a652-85d9-4fa9-b959-2665b61a0d32/NWP-114M-(Spanish)1.
218. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 67, at 257.
219. BASICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MODERN SOLDIERS, supra note 108.
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globally, it could send a constructive message to other nations that China
respects international law by peacefully and professionally challenging
excessive maritime claims that contravene international law. At the
same time, however, China’s Government would need to reexamine its
own excessive maritime claims. China must either rescind or modify
those claims, or at least make honest efforts to justify them under
international law in an open and detailed fashion.
Third, the Chinese Government should go “on the record” and
specifically explain its legal positions on many of the contested issues of
international law, including those involving the law of the sea.
Admittedly, China has made some efforts in the past ten years to be more
transparent on some legal matters. For example, the Chinese Journal of
International Law includes not only law review articles by Chinese
academics, but also occasionally public statements by PRC officials on
matters involving international law as well as annual summaries of
China’s practice in public international law.220 Official analyses or
interpretations by the Chinese Government on issues like the purported
authority to restrict military activities in its exclusive economic zone or
the actual meaning and legal justification of its nine-dash line in the
South China Sea would be a valuable overture to the global community
and would demonstrate that China honestly believes that international
law supports its position and that China is not being intentionally vague
in order to hide the weaknesses of its legal arguments. Additionally,
China could make efforts to gather and publish its nation’s practices in a
public international law journal. But because this did not occur prior to
the inaugural publication of the Chinese Journal of International Law in
2001, foreign nations have neither an understanding nor appreciation for
what customary international law developed in China prior to that year.
Fourth, the Chinese Government should consider abandoning
tenuous legal arguments. When Chinese officials and academics take
clauses of treaties out of context, ignore the negotiating history of
treaties, or disregard a consensus view, China loses credibility with the
global community. That loss of credibility occurs not only with the
specific issue at hand, but also with respect to China’s overall standing as
a nation that claims to respect and strictly comply with international law.
An effective trial advocate knows that successful advocacy for one’s
client means picking one’s battles—that is, refraining from making every
possible argument. Similarly, a rising China should be confident enough

220. See About this Journal, CHINESE J. INT’L L., http://www.oxfordjournals.org/
our_journals/cjilaw/about.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
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to admit that the existing state of international law on a particular point is
not on China’s side.
Fifth, the Chinese Government should consider doing “over the
table” what it is apparently attempting to do “under the table”—namely,
changing the final text of UNCLOS. As previously discussed, the
Convention expressly allows state parties to propose amendments.
Because China admitted before the ink fully dried on the 1982 text that
221
the Convention was “imperfect” and had “serious drawbacks,” China
would be well within its rights as a state party to propose amendments to
correct the perceived imperfections. Although other state parties might
not support China’s proposed amendments, they would at least respect
China for adhering to the procedural rule of law established in this
international legal regime.
Sixth, the Chinese Government should consider expressing its
disfavor of other nation’s actions solely as a matter of policy, rather than
as a matter of law. Without mischaracterizing the lawful activities of
other nations as illegal and undermining China’s credibility within the
existing international legal order, China could diplomatically encourage
other nations to modify their behavior, with the caveat that both sides
should enter into any bilateral understandings voluntarily, absent undue
pressure or coercion from China’s economic or military power.
Moreover, the fact that China approaches another nation to reach such a
common understanding does not mean that the other nation should, must,
or will agree to do so.222 Regardless, the risk that China might fail to
persuade another nation to reach such a bilateral diplomatic

221. See Gao, supra note 78, at 277.
222. See generally Patrick J. Neher et al., In Defense of High Seas Freedoms, RSIS
COMMENTARIES, Mar. 24, 2009,
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/
RSIS0312009.pdf, stating that:
From the Chinese perspective, when they asked the US to stop surveillance
activities in the East and South China Seas and the US refused, it signified a lack
of respect. The irony, of course, is that there is no surer sign of greatness in a
nation or its Navy than to acknowledge and accept the exercise of navigational
rights and freedoms by others. But why shouldn’t the US curtail its military
activities in and above the Chinese EEZ, in the interests of comity?
The answer is two-fold. First, it is an exceedingly thin line between comity and
acquiescence to an excessive claim. Second, the navigational rights and freedoms
established in the law of the sea are fundamental to the maintenance of public
order and the development of international trade upon which depends our shared
economic prosperity. As China expands its naval capability, we hope it will join
other nations of the world as guarantors of freedoms of the seas.
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understanding should not cause China to continue its self-discrediting
rhetoric of assembling legal clauses to make political arguments.
VII. CONCLUSION
As a subspecialty of international law, the same rules of
interpretation and modification and processes of development that apply
to international law also apply to the law of the sea. Pursuant to those
rules and processes, a robust legal regime for the law of the sea has been
developed; yet many of the existing realities of the law of the sea do not
align with China’s desires. While China could have opted otherwise, it
voluntarily chose to join UNCLOS in 1996 without simultaneously
exercising its right to enter Declarations on some of the provisions of
UNCLOS. Rather than attempting to invalidate or unilaterally withdraw
from UNCLOS, China appears to be addressing these disconnects
through other means. Specifically, China has employed a robust rhetoric
on law of the sea matters—rhetoric which appears to be consistent with
the existing international legal order, but which actually questions that
order.
The flaws in China’s rhetoric on law of the sea matters are
significant. China’s rhetoric is inconsistent with what China is saying to
internal audiences; it ignores the reality that the United States has valued
and upheld the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea guaranteed to all
nations under international law; it disregards the reality that China poses
a substantial risk to freedom of navigation, holding a “full house” of
excessive claims in every possible maritime zone; it overlooks the reality
that China has conducted and continues to conduct similar military
activities in the exclusive economic zones of other nations; it exhibits a
lack of transparency; and has also been less than trustworthy on
statements of fact about recent incidents and misleading on citations to
law.
Some observers might consider China’s use of rhetoric to be “just
words” with no actual effect. But the reality is that this use of rhetoric is
state action and can have negative effects, especially given that the goal
of using legal rhetoric is to appear in compliance with an existing law,
while actually exploiting that law by unilaterally changing it to the user’s
benefit or advantage. The potential second and third order effects are
troubling. If a nation such as China is allowed to play “fast and loose”
with the standards and terminology of the established legal order, then
other nations in the world might follow that negative example. This
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223
could result in an “arms race” of legal warfare—where rival nations
increase the quantity or quality of legal restraints in attempts to deter,
deny, or dominate rival nations. The innocent victim or collateral
damage in such legal warfare is the rule of law itself. Bodies of law,
such as that reflected in UNCLOS, were the product of years of intense,
but peaceful, negotiations by many nations. Hence, the world cannot
afford to allow one nation, or a handful of nations, to disregard their
legal obligations merely because it is not “perfect” in their self-interested
eyes. Despite China’s highly-concerning use of rhetoric on law of the
sea matters, there are ways that China could reassure the world in the
immediate future that it does, in fact, respect international law, including
the law of the sea.
Ultimately, representatives and supporters of China might take
umbrage with one or more assertions throughout this Article. The
response to such umbrage is this: Alternative views from China are
welcome and encouraged—so long as they provide specific
disagreements and detailed law-based explanations, instead of simply
providing more rhetorical and recycled platitudes. Only then can any
legal discussion, official or otherwise, advance beyond recurring talking
points toward a truly “mature” dialogue.
At the same time, those in China must understand and appreciate that
the truth of the assertions in this Article are, to some extent, immaterial.
In other words, the legal advisors in China’s Government might very
well have developed and already possess on file detailed analysis
underlying their legal conclusions on some of its law of the sea issues.
Trust, and more importantly, mistrust is often a matter of perception. If
China continues not to share its legal analysis of international law issues

223. See, e.g., Bradford A. Lee, Arms Race, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/
topics/arms-race (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
Over the past century, the arms race metaphor has assumed a prominent place in
public discussion of military affairs. But even more than the other colorful
metaphors of security studies--balance of power, escalation, and the like--it may
cloud rather than clarify understanding of the dynamics of international
rivalries. . . . A close examination of the historical evidence reveals a different
picture. Political purposes almost always drive and govern arms races. It is
common for a major race to be initiated by a state interested in changing the
political status quo. In some cases, the response of states content with the status
quo is swift and resolute, but in other cases it is constrained by domestic political
or economic considerations or diverted by diplomatic calculations. The course of
an arms race has frequently exacerbated a sense of rivalry and occasionally even
determined the timing of a war; but most often it has ended in a political settlement
between rivals or in a decision by one side to moderate its buildup.
Id.
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with the world, other nations will continue to interpret such opaqueness
in the worst possible light, adding to their express concerns over whether
they can ever trust China.
Absent China changing its course in substantive ways like those
suggested in this Article, the author is concerned that the global
community of nations will continue to perceive China as attempting to
unilaterally rewrite or manipulate an established body of international
law and restrict the lawful uses of the oceans—all while it rhetorically
reassures the world, in the words of Director-General Duan, that China
“strictly complies” with that body of law. That duplicity, actual or
perceived, will continue until the nations of the world, individually and
collectively, send a consistent message to China: Rhetoric about
international law means nothing. Genuine respect for the law, and
actions that demonstrate compliance with the law, is what matters most.

